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DISMANTLING MONUMENTS
Richard H. Seamon*
Abstract
The Antiquities Act of 1906 authorizes the President to “declare”
certain objects “to be national monuments,” and to “reserve parcels of
land” to protect those national monuments. The Act does not expressly
authorize the President to reduce or rescind a monument established by a
prior President under the Act, and recent actions by President Donald
Trump raise the question whether the Act impliedly authorizes such
reductions or rescissions. The majority of legal scholars who have studied
this question have said no, the Act does not grant such implied authority.
This Article takes the contrary position. The President’s authority under
the Antiquities Act to reduce a monument previously established under
the Act is established by (1) past presidential practice; (2) congressional
acquiescence; and (3) official opinions of the Attorney General and the
Solicitor of the U.S. Department of the Interior. Further, the President’s
authority to rescind such a monument (1) follows logically from the
President’s power to reduce a monument; (2) reflects the President’s
constitutional duty to take care that the Antiquities Act is faithfully
executed; and (3) accords with the general rule that prevents the current
President from being bound by the acts of predecessors in that office.
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INTRODUCTION
By the time President Barack Obama left office, he had set aside more
than half a billion acres of federal land as national monuments under the
Antiquities Act of 1906.1 Soon after assuming office, President Donald
Trump announced that he was “committed to rolling back the egregious
abuse of the Antiquities Act.”2 To that end, Trump ordered a review of
twenty-seven monuments that had been created or expanded since

1. 54 U.S.C. §§ 320301–320303 (2012); Coral Davenport, Obama Designates Monuments
in Nevada and Utah, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2016, at A14 (reporting that as of that date Obama had
designated 553 million acres in monuments); Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, With New
Monuments in Nevada, Utah, Obama Adds to His Environmental Legacy, WASH. POST, Dec. 28,
2016, at A2.
2. Dan Merica & Kevin Liptak, Trump Order Could Roll Back Public Lands Protections
from 3 Presidents, CNN POLITICS, http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/25/politics/donald-trumpfederal-lands-antiquities/index.html (containing video clip of President Trump’s remarks at the
Interior Department) (last updated Apr. 26, 2017).
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President Bill Clinton took office in 1996.3 The review led Trump to slash
the size of two huge monuments in Utah: the Grand Staircase Escalante
and the Bears National Monuments.4 That move immediately prompted
lawsuits by environmental organizations and Native American tribes,
among other plaintiffs.5 The plaintiffs in those suits will emphasize that
the Antiquities Act does not expressly authorize the President to reduce
or abolish national monuments.6 The question those lawsuits pose is thus
whether the Act impliedly authorizes the President to do so.
No court has ever addressed that question, but the academic
community almost unanimously says no, the Antiquities Act does not
impliedly authorize the President to reduce or abolish a monument
created under that Act.7 This Article takes the contrary position. Part I
3. Exec. Order No. 13,792, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429 (Apr. 26, 2017); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior, Interior Department Releases List of Monuments Under Review, Announces FirstEver Formal Public Comment Period for Antiquities Act Monuments (May 5, 2017),
https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/interior-department-releases-list-monuments-under-reviewannounces-first-ever-formal; see Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139 (Dec. 28, 2016)
(creating Bears Ears National Monument).
4. Proclamation No. 9682, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,089 (Dec. 8, 2017) (modifying Grand
Escalante); Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,081 (Dec. 8, 2017) (modifying Bears Ears);
see Josh Dawsey & Juliet Eilperin, Trump Shrinks Two Huge National Monuments in Utah,
Drawing Praise and Protests, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/trump-scales-back-two-huge-national-monuments-in-utah-drawing-praise-and-protests/
2017/12/04/758c85c6-d908-11e7-b1a8-62589434a581_story.html?utm_term=.576b908d40b1
(reporting that Trump reduced Bears Ears by about 85%, cutting about 1.1 million acres, and
reduced Grand Staircase by almost 46%, cutting more than 800,000 acres).
5. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Hopi Tribe v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv02590 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2017); Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, The Wilderness
Soc’y v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02587 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2017); Complaint for Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief, Grand Staircase Escalante Partners v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02591-EGS
(D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2017); Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Utah Diné Bikéyah v.
Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02605-TSC (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2017); Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory
Relief, Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02606 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2017).
6. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (authorizing President to “declare by public proclamation”
certain objects on federal land “to be national monuments”); id. § 320301(b) (authorizing
President to “reserve parcels of land as a part of the national monuments”); see also infra notes
10–32 and accompanying text (discussing text of Antiquities Act).
7. Mark Squillace et al., Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or Diminish National
Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 56 (2017) (concluding that “the President lacks the legal
authority to abolish or diminish national monuments”); Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy
of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 37 GA. L. REV. 473, 553 (2003) [hereinafter Squillace, Monumental
Legacy] (“The idea that Congress granted the President ‘one-way’ authority to create, but not
revoke or modify, national monuments is compelling . . . .”); Letter from 121 Law Professors to
Sec’y of Interior Ryan Zinke and Sec’y of Commerce Wilbur Ross (July 6, 2017), http://legalplanet.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/national-monuments-comment-letter-from-lawprofessors_as-filed.pdf (commenting, in response to executive order requiring review of certain
past monuments, that Antiquities Act “gives the President authority only to identify and reserve a
monument, not to diminish or abolish one”); see also Memorandum from Robert Rosenbaum et
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introduces the Antiquities Act and shows that it does not authorize
million-acre designations such as Bears Ears. This showing, if accepted,
sharpens the current dispute by posing the issue of whether a President
can reduce or abolish a monument created by a prior President in
violation of the Antiquities Act. Part II shows that the President can
modify a monument created under the Act, a power demonstrated most
forcefully by the repeated instances in which presidents have done so.
Part III shows that the President also can abolish a monument altogether.
Finally, Part IV responds to arguments against this Article’s position.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
As its name suggests, the Antiquities Act is designed to protect
specific objects—“historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures,
and other objects of historic or scientific interest”—that is, antiquities.8
al., Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, The President Has No Power Unilaterally to Abolish or
Materially Change a National Monument Designation Under the Antiquities Act of 1906 (May
3, 2017), https://www.npca.org/resources/3197-legal-analysis-of-presidential-ability-to-revokenational-monuments#sm.0001jmr0m11wcf13w0b1mn08jo4t2. Some scholars have argued that
the President cannot abolish monuments created under the Antiquities Act, while expressing
uncertainty about, or even support for, the President’s power to reduce the size of such
monuments. See Albert C. Lin, Clinton’s National Monuments: A Democrat’s Undemocratic
Acts?, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 711–12 (2002) (“Once the President establishes a monument, he is
without power to revoke or rescind the reservation, although it remains uncertain whether the
President may reduce a monument in size.”); Michael Margherita, The Antiquities Act & National
Monuments: Analysis of Geological, Ecological, & Archaeological Resources of the Colorado
Plateau, 30 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 273, 286, 291 (2017) (stating that “the evidence . . . suggests that an
implied power to abolish monuments does not exist” but that “[i]t is unclear whether the
Antiquities Act grants the president the implied power to diminish an existing national
monument”); James R. Rasband, The Future of the Antiquities Act, 21 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 619, 626, 628 (2001) (stating that “it seems likely that a court would deny a president
the power to revoke a prior national monument designation” but that the courts might uphold
presidential reductions of monuments); see also Robert B. Keiter, The Monument, the Plan, and
Beyond, 21 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 521, 533 (2001) (“[T]here is no explicit or implicit
authority in the Antiquities Act to rescind a national monument designation, and no precedent for
such a presidential action.”); cf. Scott Y. Nishimoto, President Clinton’s Designation of the Grand
Canyon-Parashant National Monument: Using Statutory Interpretation Models to Determine the
Proper Application of the Antiquities Act, 17 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 51, 55 (2002) (“[T]he
Antiquities Act . . . authorizes the President to reduce the size of existing national monuments to
conform with the ‘smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects
to be protected’ clause.”). But see John Yoo & Todd Gaziano, Presidential Authority to Revoke
or Reduce National Monument Designations, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., Mar. 2017, at 6; see also
Joseph M. Feller, Recent Developments in Public Land Law: National Monuments, National
Forest Roadless Areas, and BLM Rangeland Management, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY:
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 179, 183 (2001) (“The Antiquities Act contains no authorization for
revocation of national monuments, but it is arguable that the power to revoke is implicit in the
power to create.”).
8. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a).
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To protect antiquities, the Act authorizes the President to reserve small
“parcels” of public land surrounding them.9 Soon after the Act became
law in 1906, however, presidents began using it sometimes to protect
entire landscapes, and not just discrete antiquities. That use violates the
Act’s original intent. The frequent violations of the Act make it
particularly important to determine whether the President can reduce or
abolish monuments to remedy those violations.
A. The Text of the Antiquities Act
The Antiquities Act has two main provisions. The first provision
allows the President to “declare” certain objects “to be national
monuments”:
(a) Presidential Declaration. The President may, in the
President’s discretion, declare by public proclamation
historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and
other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated
on land owned or controlled by the Federal Government to
be national monuments.10
The second provision allows the President to “reserve parcels of land as
a part of the national monuments,” stating in full:
(b) Reservation of land. The President may reserve
parcels of land as a part of the national monuments. The
limits of the parcels shall be confined to the smallest area
compatible with the proper care and management of the
objects to be protected.11
The President can declare monuments and reserve parcels of land to
protect them without consulting state and local officials in the monument
area or considering impacts on people in the area.12 Nor does the

9. Id. § 320301(b).
10. Id. § 320301(a).
11. Id. § 320301(b).
12. James R. Rasband, Antiquities Act Monuments: The Elgin Marbles of Our Public
Lands?, in THE ANTIQUITIES ACT 137, 137 (David Harmon et al. eds., 2006) (“Over and over in
its 100-year history, the Antiquities Act has been wielded by presidents without any regard for
the local rural communities and the state and county governments most impacted by the
monument’s designation.”); see also, e.g., S. REP. NO. 106-250, at 2 (2000) (“Since the passage
of the Antiquities Act in 1906 many laws have been enacted which provide for increased public
participation in the management of federal lands. While the Antiquities Act confers presidential
authority to designate new monuments, it contains no requirements for public participation prior
to any such designation.”).
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President need Congress’s advice or consent to create a monument.13
Unlike other decisions affecting public land, the President’s
establishment of a national monument is not subject to the National
Environmental Policy Act.14 More generally, the Act is distinctive in
giving the President unilateral power to withdraw land from the public
domain.15
While the Antiquities Act allows the President to create a monument
with the stroke of a pen, the Act also has a sharp focus. The Act limits
national monuments to three types of objects: (1) historic landmarks; (2)
historic and prehistoric structures; and (3) “other objects of historic or
scientific interest.”16 And it requires that land reserved for a monument
“be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and
management of the objects to be protected.”17 Thus, the Act expressly
contemplates that the President will use it when determining that a
particular landmark, structure, or other antiquity has historic or scientific
13. RONALD A. FORESTA, AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARKS AND THEIR KEEPERS 74–75 (1984)
(stating that, in period when Presidents used Antiquities Act authority expansively, “agency
leadership had at their disposal a means of expansion which circumvented Congress entirely”);
Eric C. Rusnak, The Straw that Broke the Camel’s Back? Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument Antiquates the Antiquities Act, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 672 (2003) (“[U]nder the terms
of the Act, the president is not required to consult with local and state authorities. Neither is the
president obligated to seek congressional advice and consent prior to declaring lands national
monuments.”); John F. Shepherd, Up the Grand Staircase: Executive Withdrawals and the Future
of the Antiquities Act, 43 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 4–1, 4–9 (1997) (stating that Antiquities Act
does not “require the President to follow any particular procedures, such as a public hearing or
consultation with Congress, before designating a national monument”).
14. Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155, 1160 (D. Alaska 1978).
15. HAL ROTHMAN, PRESERVING DIFFERENT PASTS: THE AMERICAN NATIONAL MONUMENTS
xi–xii (1989) (stating that the Act is so significant because, as it came to be interpreted, it “created
a mechanism through which federal officials, interested professionals, and other special-interest
groups could achieve preservation goals without waiting on popular or congressional consensus”);
John D. Leshy, Putting the Antiquities Act in Perspective, in VISIONS OF THE GRAND STAIRCASEESCALANTE: EXAMINING UTAH’S NEWEST NATIONAL MONUMENT 84 (Robert B. Keiter et al. eds.,
1998) (describing Antiquities Act as “somewhat unusual statute” because “[b]y its terms,
Congress has vested in the president a broad power to act, unilaterally, unencumbered by process
or any legal duty to consult”). The term “public domain” historically referred to governmentowned lands that were open to entry and settlement by private persons for use as homesteads or
for other uses such as grazing and mining. Public Domain, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1424 (10th
ed. 2014). When land is “withdrawn” from the public domain, that means it is no longer open to
entry and settlement by private persons. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1702(j) (2012) (defining
“withdrawal” for purposes of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act). When land in the
public domain is “reserved,” that means it is earmarked for a particular purpose, to the exclusion
of others. See David H. Getches, Managing the Public Lands: The Authority of the Executive to
Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 279, 285 (1982). See generally 1 CHARLES F. WHEATLEY,
JR., STUDY OF WITHDRAWALS AND RESERVATIONS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN LANDS (1969).
16. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a).
17. Id. § 320301(b).
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value; in that event, the President may reserve the land necessary to
protect it.
By specifying types of objects that can be protected as “national
monuments,” the Act implies that its purpose is to protect discrete,
identifiable antiquities. This purpose is reinforced by Section 1 of the
original Act, which imposed criminal penalties for the unauthorized
removal, damage or destruction of discrete archeological objects or sites:
[A]ny person who shall appropriate, excavate, injure, or
destroy any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any
object of antiquity, situated on lands owned or controlled by
the Government of the United States, without the permission
of the Secretary of the Department of the Government
having jurisdiction over the lands on which said antiquities
are situated, shall, upon conviction, be fined in a sum of not
more than five hundred dollars or be imprisoned for a period
of not more than ninety days, or shall suffer both fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.18
In addition to Section 1’s punishment for stealing or harming antiquities,
Section 3 authorizes the government to grant permits “for the
examination of ruins, the excavation of archeological sites, and the
gathering of objects of antiquity on land” within a monument.19 These
provisions confirm that the Act’s purpose is to protect discrete antiquities
and the specific land (“parcels”) around them.20
The text of the Act does not comprehensively address the legal effect
of declaring a monument and reserving land for it. In recent practice, the
use of land reserved as a national monument is severely restricted. The
proclamation establishing Bears Ears, similar to other recent monument
proclamations, contains the following restrictive language:
All Federal lands and interests in lands within the boundaries
of the monument are hereby appropriated and withdrawn
from all forms of entry, location, selection, sale, or other
disposition under the public land laws or laws applicable to
the U.S. Forest Service, from location, entry, and patent
18. Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1866(b) (2012)).
19. Id. § 3 (current version at 54 U.S.C. § 320302 (2012)).
20. See Richard M. Johannsen, Comment, Public Land Withdrawal Policy and the
Antiquities Act, 56 WASH. L. REV. 439, 449 n.75 (1981) (“Consideration of the three sections of
the Antiquities Act in pari materia compels the conclusion that the purpose of the Act was to
protect objects of antiquity.”); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452–53 (1892)
(holding that State couldn't constitutionally grant entire lakebed under Lake Michigan to railroad
company in fee simple but could instead only convey “parcels” of the lakebed for public
improvements like piers and wharves).
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under the mining laws, and from disposition under all laws
relating to mineral and geothermal leasing, other than by
exchange that furthers the protective purposes of the
monument.21
Through such language, the proclamation “changes the property from
being federal land available for multiple uses” to land the uses of which
can be restricted to serve the “overriding management goal” of protecting
the designated antiquities.22
The Bears Ears proclamation and other recent ones make the
monument’s establishment “subject to valid existing rights.”23 But “the
extent to which [monument] designations may affect existing rights is not
always clear.”24 That is because—as is true of the proclamation creating
Bears Ears—recent proclamations direct the agencies charged with
administering the monuments to adopt management plans. These
management plans may impose restrictions that restrict the exercise of
existing rights if the agency deems the restrictions necessary to protect
the designated antiquities.25 As the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
and the Forest Service say in a “fact sheet” on Bears Ears, the exercise of
valid existing rights and conduct of other previously approved activities
may continue only “as long as they are consistent with the care and
management of the objects identified in the national monument
proclamation.”26
The potential restrictions are illustrated by the management plan for
Utah’s Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, perhaps the most
21. Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139, 1143 (Dec. 28, 2016). The proclamation
further provides that laws governing grazing permits or leases on lands under the jurisdiction of
the U.S. Forest Service or the Bureau of Land Management “shall continue to apply with regard
to the lands in the monument to ensure the ongoing consistency with the care and management of
the objects identified above.” Id. at 1145. The proclamation also makes the monument’s
establishment “subject to valid existing rights, including valid existing water rights.” Id. at 1143;
see ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44687, ANTIQUITIES ACT: SCOPE OF
AUTHORITY FOR MODIFICATION OF NATIONAL MONUMENTS 3 (2016) (quoting restrictive language,
similar to that quoted in the text, found in “[r]ecent proclamations under the Antiquities Act”),
http://www.law.indiana.edu/publicland/files/national_monuments_modifications_CRS.pdf.
22. See NAME REDACTED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41330, NATIONAL MONUMENTS AND
THE ANTIQUITIES ACT 7–8 (2017), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170130_R41330_
e313e8a36511852dca4acb3687edf27c4ef3aab0.pdf.
23. Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139, 1143 (Dec. 28, 2016).
24. NAME REDACTED, supra note 22, at 7, 8.
25. Id. at 7–9; James R. Rasband, Utah’s Grand Staircase: The Right Path to Wilderness
Preservation?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 483, 520–21 (1999) (noting that monument designations
preserving existing rights still “allow[] a variety of restrictions to avoid degradation or impairment
of the lands within the Monument”).
26. U.S. FOREST SERV. & BLM, BEARS EARS NATIONAL MONUMENT: QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS 2 (2016), https://www.fs.fed.us/sites/default/files/bear-ears-fact-sheet.pdf.
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controversial monument established by President Clinton.27 Two
“precepts” drive that Plan’s “overall vision”: (1) “[s]afeguarding the
remote and undeveloped frontier character of the Monument,” and (2)
supporting “the study of scientific and historic resources.”28 To achieve
those goals, the Plan restricts visitor facilities and motorized access to
monument lands and curtails any activities unrelated to land preservation
and scientific study.29 Indeed, even proposed scientific research “will be
carefully reviewed” if it has “potentially intrusive or destructive”
effects.30 For all “valid existing rights,” which the Plan calls “VERs,” the
“adjudication process” entails continual, close scrutiny “for the life of
each VER” to ensure “full compliance with the law.”31 For existing
mining claims and mill sites, moreover, the Plan announces that “the
BLM will initiate a validity examination process to verify the VERs of
claimants before such claimants conduct surface disturbing activities
greater than casual use.”32 Overall, the Plan leaves no doubt that VER
holders can anticipate a new regime of regulatory scrutiny and
restrictions.
B. The Legislative History of the Antiquities Act
As discussed above, the text of the Antiquities Act shows that
Congress intended to protect discrete antiquities—historic landmarks,
historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or
scientific interest located on public land—by protecting the antiquities
themselves and small areas of land around them. That intention also
emerges plainly from the history of the Act.
The quarter-century before the 1906 enactment of the Antiquities Act
saw renewed and growing interest in American antiquities.33 American
27. See generally Rasband, supra note 25 (discussing controversies arising from creation
of Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument).
28. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR: BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., GRAND STAIRCASE-ESCALANTE
NATIONAL MONUMENT MANAGEMENT PLAN 5 (1999), https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-frontoffice/projects/lup/65870/79803/92581/GSENM_MP.pdf.
29. Id. at 3–5.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 51.
32. Id.
33. Ronald Freeman Lee, The Antiquities Act of 1906, 42 J. SW. 198, 198–213 (2000).
Ronald Lee was the Chief Historian of the National Park Service from 1938 to 1951; he wrote his
history of the Act for publication in celebration of the centennial of Yellowstone National Park in
1972. Raymond Harris Thompson, “An Old and Reliable Authority”: Introduction, 42 J. SW. 191,
191 (2000). Lee’s history is reproduced, with minor edits, in volume 42 of the Journal of the
Southwest; it also is available on the National Park Service’s website. See Ronald F. Lee, The
Story of the Antiquities Act, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/archeology/pubs/Lee/
index.htm (last updated Mar. 15, 2016, 5:20 PM).
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interest in these objects rekindled as the embers of the Civil War cooled.34
According to a leading historian of the Act, the year 1879 was particularly
significant. Several events occurred in that year, including this one:
In [1879] Congress authorized establishment of the Bureau
of Ethnology, later renamed the Bureau of American
Ethnology, in the Smithsonian Institution to increase and
diffuse knowledge of the American Indian. Major John
Wesley Powell, who had lost his right arm in the Battle of
Shiloh and who in 1869 had led his remarkable boat
expedition through the Grand Canyon of the Colorado River,
was appointed its first director. He headed the Bureau until
his death in 1902. During this long period, he and his
colleagues became a major force for the protection of
antiquities on federal lands.35
The Smithsonian hosted a gathering of archeologists and anthropologists
who formed an organization that evolved into the American
Anthropological Association.36 That organization, “in turn, provided
crucial support for the American Antiquities Act in 1906.”37
Interest in antiquities on public land first produced federal legislation
in 1889.38 In that year, Congress enacted a law to protect the Casa Grande
structure in Arizona.39 The law authorized the President to reserve the
land around the structure from settlement and sale.40 In 1892, President
Benjamin Harrison exercised that authority: He issued an executive order
reserving the Casa Grande Ruin and 480 acres around it for “protection
because of its archaeological value.”41
The growing American interest in antiquities on public land led to a
greater need to protect them.42 Both amateur and professional antiquity
hunters—“pot hunters”—were removing antiquities from the public

34. ROTHMAN, supra note 15, at 6–7.
35. Lee, supra note 33, at 198 (citations omitted). The other 1879 events that historian Lee
cites as significant include the publication of “a superbly illustrated book” showing antiquities in
the American Southwest, the election for the first time of an anthropologist to be president of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the founding of the Archaeological
Institute of America. Id. at 198–200.
36. Id. at 199.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 209.
39. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 411, 25 Stat. 939.
40. Id. at 961.
41. Lee, supra note 33, at 209. Casa Grande was re-designated a national monument by
President Woodrow Wilson on August 3, 1918. Proclamation No. 1470, 40 Stat. 1818 (1918).
42. ROTHMAN, supra note 15, at 6–30; Lee, supra note 33, at 213.
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lands and vandalizing the sites on which they were located.43 A
commercial market arose to meet public demand.44 The need for legal
protection of these American antiquities became apparent.45
Bills to provide that protection were introduced beginning in early
1900.46 One bill, proposed by the Department of Interior, would have
given the President broad authority to withdraw unlimited amounts of
public land as national parks—all to be administered exclusively by the
Secretary of Interior—for a wide variety of purposes, including their
scenic beauty:
The President of the United States may, from time to time,
set apart and reserve tracts of public land, which for their
scenic beauty, natural wonders or curiosities, ancient ruins
or relics, or other objects of scientific or historic interest, or
springs of medicinal or other properties it is desirable to
protect and utilize in the interest of the public; and the
President shall, by public proclamation, declare the
establishment of such reservations and the limits thereof.47
This and the other bills were referred to the House Committee on the
Public Lands, whose chairman was Representative John F. Lacey of
Iowa.48 As historian Ronald Lee wrote, the Interior Department’s bill met
with a cool reception.49 Representative Lacey told the Interior Secretary
that the committee
seemed to be unanimously of the opinion that it would not
be wise to grant authority in the Department of the Interior
to create National parks generally, but that it would be
desirable to give the authority to set apart small reservations,
43. 33 CONG. REC. 4872 (1900) (statement of Rep. Lacey, primary sponsor of the
Antiquities Act, that bill then under consideration would penalize “pot hunter[s]”); see H.R. REP.
NO. 56-1104, at 1 (1900) ([T]he destruction of [ruins in Southwest United States] is taking place
more and more each year.”); Preservation of Historic and Prehistoric Ruins, Etc.: Hearing on S.
4127 Before the S. Subcomm. of Comm. on Public Lands, 58th Cong. 4 (1904) (testimony of Dr.
Francis W. Kelsey, Sec’y of Archeological Institute of America) (stating that public lands were
being looted of valuable archeological objects and that sites from which they were being taken
were “so completely disfigured in the process that the remains become valueless for scientific
purposes”); JOHN ISE, OUR NATIONAL PARK POLICY: A CRITICAL HISTORY 144–46 (1961).
44. See Lee, supra note 33, at 218.
45. ISE, supra note 43, at 147; Lee, supra note 33, at 223–30.
46. ISE, supra note 43, at 149–50; Lee, supra note 33, at 223–30.
47. Lee, supra note 33, at 227–28 (quoting H.R. 11021, 56th Cong. (1900)).
48. Id. at 227.
49. Id. at 228; Shepherd, supra note 13, at 4–10 (“The House committee was not pleased
with this request for a broad grant of executive authority.”); see also Johannsen, supra note 20, at
449–50 (stating that in years leading up to enactment of Act, “the Department of Interior
repeatedly proposed adding scenic and scientific resources as objects worthy of protection”).
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not exceeding 320 acres each, where the same contained cliff
dwellings and other prehistoric remains.50
Historian Lee explains that the committee opposed Interior’s broad
proposal because of the huge withdrawals of public lands that had been
made by presidents under the Forest Reserve Act of 1891.51 The
Committee eventually reported out a much narrower bill in spring 1900
that allowed the Interior Secretary to
set apart and reserve from sale, entry, and settlement any
public lands in Colorado, Wyoming, Arizona, and New
Mexico containing monuments, cliff dwellings, cemeteries,
graves, mounds, forts, or any other work of prehistoric,
primitive, or aboriginal man, each such reservation not to
exceed 320 acres.52
By limiting each reservation to 320 acres, the bill contemplated that its
authority would be used to “creat[e] reservations of the land surrounding
each ruin.”53
Only four years later, beginning in 1904, did Congress again consider
proposed legislation to protect antiquities. The Senate passed legislation
known for its chief sponsor, Henry Cabot Lodge.54 The Lodge Bill passed
the Senate in April 1904, and, as amended, was reported favorably out on
the House side, but Congress adjourned without passage in the House.55
The Lodge Bill would have authorized the Secretary of Interior to
withdraw public lands of up to 640 acres to protect historic and
prehistoric ruins, monuments, archaeological objects, and antiquities.56
But the Lodge Bill was not enacted.57

50. Lee, supra note 33, at 228 (quoting ROBERT CLAUSE, INFORMATION ABOUT THE
BACKGROUND OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT OF 1906 (1945) (Department of the Interior Internal
Report, May 10, 1945) (NPS-W-H) (on deposit with Office of Archeology and Historic
Preservation of the National Park Service)) (citation omitted); see also ISE, supra note 43, at 150
(“Lacey . . . wrote . . . that the Public Lands Committee did not favor the provision authorizing
the Department of the interior to create national parks and thought the areas reserved should be
restricted to 320 acres.”).
51. Lee, supra note 33, at 228–29.
52. Id. at 229 (paraphrasing H.R. 10451, 58th Cong., (1900)) (citation omitted).
53. H.R. REP. NO. 56-1104, at 1, 2 (1900).
54. See H.R. REP. NO. 58-3704, at 1–2 (1905) (editing the Lodge Bill, S. 5603, 58th Cong.
(1904)); ROTHMAN, supra note 15, at 38, 40; Lee, supra note 33, at 232.
55. See Lee, supra note 33, at 235.
56. H.R. REP. NO. 58-3704, at 1 (1905) (editing the Lodge Bill, S. 5603, 58th Cong. § 2
(1904)).
57. See Lee, supra note 33, at 235.
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Instead, the bill that was ultimately enacted as the Antiquities Act was
introduced in Congress in early 1906.58 The bill had been drafted by
Edgar Lee Hewett, an influential archeologist, with input from
Representative Lacey, Chairman of the House Committee on Public
Lands.59 Lacey’s role in its enactment was so important that the
Antiquities Act was often called the Lacey Act.60 The 1906 bill drafted
by Archeologist Hewett, unlike some earlier bills, vested power to
withdraw lands to protect antiquities in the President, rather than the
Secretary of Interior.61 This change stemmed from the transfer in 1905 of
much public land containing antiquities to the Department of Agriculture,
largely through the efforts of Gifford Pinchot, Chief of the Agriculture
Department’s Bureau of Forestry.62 The 1906 bill further differed from
some of its predecessors by not containing numerical limits on the
amount of land that could be reserved to protect antiquities.63 Instead, the
bill provided, in language that was ultimately enacted, that the President
could reserve only “the smallest area compatible with the proper care and
management of the objects to the protected.”64 The 1906 bill included, as
items entitled to protection, “objects of historic or scientific interest,” a
phrase possibly taken from the bill that had been introduced in 1900 and
supported by the Department of Interior.65 The House report, however,
58. Id. at 238–39, 242; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 15, at 46–48 (discussing the passage
of the bill that became the Antiquities Act); Raymond Harris Thompson, Edgar Lee Hewett and
the Politics of Archeology, in THE ANTIQUITIES ACT, supra note 12, at 35, 43.
59. Thompson, supra note 58, at 39–40. Edgar Lee Hewett drafted the bill that was
ultimately enacted as the Antiquities Act while serving as secretary of a joint committee of the
American Anthropological Association and the Archeological Institute of America. Id. at 39. In
developing the draft bill, Hewett worked with William Afton Richards, Commissioner of the
General Land Office in the Department of Interior, and Congressman Lacey. Id. at 38–40. The
two organizations approved Hewett’s draft bill at a meeting in December 1905. Id. at 42–43.
Hewett presented the draft to Congressman Lacey, who introduced it in the House in January
1906, and it passed both houses of Congress in the spring of that year. Id. at 43; see also ROTHMAN,
supra note 15, at 43–47 (same); Lee, supra note 33, at 237–38, 241 (similar description of
Hewett’s role in drafting the bill enacted as the Antiquities Act); cf. ISE, supra note 43, at 152
(stating that the ultimately successful bill was “drafted in the office of Commissioner Richards
with the co-operation of [Representative] Lacey and Dr. Hewett”).
60. Lee, supra note 33, at 242; Rebecca Conrad, John F. Lacey: Conservation’s Public
Servant, in THE ANTIQUITIES ACT, supra note 12, at 48, 51. Congressman Lacey also gave his
name to another statute, also known as the Lacey Act, that was enacted in 1900 and that protects
certain wildlife. Lacey Act of 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 42–43 (2012) and 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–78 (2012)).
61. See H.R. REP. NO. 58-3704, at 1–2 (1905); Lee, supra note 33, at 235, 238–39.
62. Lee, supra note 33, at 236.
63. Id. at 240–41.
64. Id. (quoting the 1906 bill that became the Antiquities Act).
65. Id. at 240 (“At some point in his discussions with government departments, [Edgar Lee]
Hewett was persuaded, probably by officials of the Interior Department, to broaden his draft to
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confirmed that the bill “proposes to create small reservations reserving
only so much land as may be absolutely necessary for the preservation of
these interesting relics of prehistoric times.”66
The Act’s intended narrow focus was reaffirmed in a colloquy on the
floor of the House between Representative Lacey and Congressman John
H. Stephens of Texas:
Mr. LACEY: . . . [T]his [bill] will merely make small
reservations where the objects are of sufficient interest to
preserve them. . . .
Mr. STEPHENS of Texas: How much land will be taken
off the market in the Western States by the passage of the
bill?
Mr. LACEY: Not very much. The bill provides that it
shall be the smallest area necesstry [sic] for the care and
maintenance of the objects to be preserved.
Mr. STEPHENS of Texas: Would it be anything like the
forest-reserve bill, by which seventy or eighty million acres
of land in the United States have been tied up?
Mr. LACEY: Certainly not. The object is entirely
different. It is to preserve these old objects of special interest
and the Indian remains in the pueblos in the Southwest,
whilst the other [the forest-reserve bill] reserves the forests
and the water courses.67
The “forest-reserve bill” to which the colloquy refers was the Forest
Reserve Act of 1891, which President Theodore Roosevelt and his
predecessors had used to reserve millions of acres of public lands as
national forests.68 The colloquy shows that Congress enacted the
include the phrase ‘other objects of historic or scientific interest.’ This language may have come
from the old Interior Department bill, H.R.11021.”).
66. H.R. REP. NO. 59-2224, at 1 (1906), https://coast.noaa.gov/data/Documents/
OceanLawSearch/House%20Report%20No.%2059-2224.pdf?redirect=301ocm.
67. 40 CONG. REC. 7888 (1906). As noted above, Congressman Lacey, whose explanation
of the Act is quoted above in the text, played such an important role in the Act’s passage that for
many years the legislation was known as the Lacey Act. Lee, supra note 33, at 242. Congressman
Lacey’s views therefore deserve great weight in interpreting the Act. See, e.g., FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 387 n.18 (1984) (citing chief sponsor’s view in interpreting federal
statute); McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1982); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978).
68. President Roosevelt had withdrawn from the public domain about 150 million acres of
land as forest reserves under the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, which was also called the General
Revision or Creative Act of 1891. Forest Reserve Act of 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103,
repealed by Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2743, 2792; PAUL W.
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Antiquities Act with the understanding that it would not allow millionacre reservations of the sort that had occurred under the 1891 law.
Instead, the 1906 Act was designed to allow the President to designate
discrete objects as national monuments and, for each such object, to
reserve only the smallest amount of land “necess[a]ry” to protect that
object.69
C. Presidential Practice Under the Antiquities Act
Although the text and history of the Antiquities Act evince an intent
to allow the President to set apart fairly small parcels of land to protect
discrete antiquities, from the very beginning presidents have sometimes
used it to create massive monuments. These large-scale designations
typically rely on language in the Act authorizing protection of “other
objects of historic or scientific interest.”70 But that language must be read
in the context of the statutory provision in which it appears and the history
of the Act described above. For that reason, scholars have recognized that
excessive designations made by some presidents violate the Act’s
original intent. Moreover, Congress’s repeated efforts to curb such abuses
preclude an argument that Congress has acquiesced in the abuse.
The relevant history begins with President Theodore Roosevelt, who
signed the Antiquities Act and was the first President to use it.71 Although
Congress was assured that the Antiquities Act would “certainly not”
allow large-scale reservations of the sort that had occurred under the

GATES & ROBERT W. SWENSON, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 580 (1968) (stating
that Roosevelt reserved about 148 million acres of forest land); Getches, supra note 15, at 288
(stating that Roosevelt withdrew 150 million acres of forest land). Largely because of President
Roosevelt’s perceived misuse of the 1891 law, Congress amended that law in 1907 to require
congressional approval for the creation of national forests in six western states. Act of Mar. 4,
1907, ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1269, 1271; see ROTHMAN, supra note 15, at 48; see also 16 U.S.C.
§ 1609(a) (2012). It was not until 1916 that President Roosevelt’s successor, Woodrow Wilson,
signed legislation creating the National Park Service to manage the national park system. Act of
Aug. 25, 1916, ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535, 535.
69. 40 CONG. REC. 7888 (1906) (statement of Rep. Lacey). As one scholar has explained,
Congress’s intention to allow a monument to consist only of the land immediately surrounding a
specific antiquity—rather than monuments, such as Bears Ears, which encompass vast expanses
of land across which various antiquities are purportedly scattered—is made clear in the House
report accompanying the bill that became the Antiquities Act. Rusnak, supra note 13, at 675. The
House report incorporated a memorandum by Edgar Lee Hewett, the archeologist who drafted the
bill ultimately enacted, “that inventoried, grouped, and described the specific Indian ruins for
which Hewett sought protection by the Act.” Id. at 675–76; see H.R. REP. NO. 59-2224, at 3–7
(1906).
70. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012).
71. Rusnak, supra note 13, at 677 (stating that Theodore Roosevelt signed the Antiquities
Act into law and used it to create the Devils Tower National Monument four months later).
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Forest Reserve Act of 1891,72 President Roosevelt’s conduct proved
otherwise. After Congress, in 1907, restricted the President’s authority to
withdraw land under the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, President Roosevelt
responded by using the Antiquities Act “in ways that closely resembled
uses of the Forest Reserve Act.”73 Although most monuments created by
President Roosevelt were small,74 some covered “[a]reas far larger than
ever conceived” by the Congress that passed the Antiquities Act.75
The best known example of Roosevelt’s large-scale monuments is the
Grand Canyon. Roosevelt created it as a national monument in 1908.76
The original monument covered more than 800,000 acres.77 The U.S.
Supreme Court held in Cameron v. United States78 that Roosevelt’s
creation of this monument fell within his authority under the Antiquities
Act.79 The Court determined that the Grand Canyon was, as Roosevelt’s
proclamation said, “an object of unusual scientific interest” as “the
greatest eroded canyon in the United States, if not in the world.”80
Some presidents after Teddy Roosevelt also created massive
monuments. In December 1978, for example, President Jimmy Carter
created thirteen national monuments in Alaska that exceeded 1 million
acres each.81 Carter’s action provoked so much controversy that
eventually Congress stepped in, passing the Alaska National Interest

72. 40 CONG. REC. 7888 (1906) (statement of Rep. Lacey).
73. ROTHMAN, supra note 15, at 48.
74. As the text accompanying this note says, most of President Roosevelt’s monuments
were small. Examples include Devils Tower, WY (1,193.91 acres), El Morro, NM (160 acres),
Montezuma Castle, AZ (161.39 acres), Lassen Peak (1,280 acres), Gila Cliff Dwellings, NM (160
acres), Tonto, AZ (640 acres), Muir Woods, CA (295 acres), Pinnacles, CA (1,320 acres), Jewel
Cave, SD (1,274.56 acres), Natural Bridges, UT (120 acres), Lewis and Clark Cavern, MT (160
acres), Tumacacori, AZ (10 acres), and Wheeler, CO (300 acres). Antiquities Act, 1906-2006:
Maps, Facts, and Figures, NAT’L PARK SERV. (May 8, 2017, 9:53 AM),
https://www.nps.gov/archeology/sites/antiquities/monumentslist.htm.
75. ROTHMAN, supra note 15, at 48.
76. Proclamation No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175 (Jan. 11, 1908).
77. NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 74.
78. 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
79. Id. at 455–56.
80. Id.
81. Proclamation Nos. 4611, 4613–14, 4616–17, 4619, 4621–27, 3 C.F.R. 69–71, 74–77,
80–83, 86–87, 89–103 (1979); see Cecil D. Andrus & John C. Freemuth, President Carter’s
Coup: An Insider’s View of the 1978 Alaska Monument Designations, in THE ANTIQUITIES ACT,
supra note 12, at 93, 98–100 (discussing how Carter’s Secretary of Interior, Cecil D. Andrus,
believed the Antiquities Act provided the best protection “against threats to the conservation of
lands”).
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Lands Conservation Act of 1980 (ANICLA).82 ANILCA, among other
things, rescinded Carter’s designations.83
More recently, President Bill Clinton embraced the theory—
engineered by Bruce Babbitt, Clinton’s Interior Secretary—that the
Antiquities Act authorizes “national landscape monuments.”84 President
Clinton tested this landscape-monument concept for the first time in
creating the Grand Staircase–Escalante National Monument.85 Grand
Staircase encompassed 1.7 million acres, which made it the largest
national monument ever designated in the continental United States.86
The landscape-monument concept underlying Grand Staircase
represented a “paradigm shift,” as “[n]ational monument designations
ha[d] traditionally been used to protect specific objects of unusual
historical or scientific value that stand out from the landscape.”87 Under
the new paradigm, President Clinton used the landscape-monument
concept primarily to protect natural ecosystems.88
82. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANICLA), Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94
Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
83. 16 U.S.C. § 3209(a) (2012); Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (2016).
84. CAROL HARDY VINCENT & PAMELA BALDWIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30528,
NATIONAL MONUMENTS AND THE ANTIQUITIES ACT: RECENT DESIGNATIONS AND ISSUES (2001)
(discussing view of Bruce Babbitt, President Clinton’s Secretary of Interior, that the Antiquities
Act protects “national landscape monuments” as well as geographic and historical “curiosities”);
James R. Rasband, The Rise of Urban Archipelagoes in the American West: A New Reservation
Policy?, 31 ENVTL. L. 1, 85, 85–86 n.418 (2001) (crediting Babbitt with devising the “landscape
monument” concept); Sanjay Ranchod, Note, The Clinton National Monuments: Protecting
Ecosystems with the Antiquities Act, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 535, 538 n.33, 576 (2001)
(crediting Babbitt with first use of term “landscape monument” and with persuading President
Clinton that the Antiquities Act would be a powerful political tool); see also Squillace, supra note
12, at 106, 114 (stating that Babbitt had “penchant . . . for monuments that would protect large
landscapes and unique ecosystems”); Bruce Babbitt, From Grand Staircase to Grand Canyon
Parashant: Is There a Monumental Future for the BLM?, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 223, 227–
28 (2000) (arguing the Antiquities Act should be used to protect “cultural landscape[s]” and that
“we can do better than to protect five or six Indian ruins out on that land and say that there is room
in this culture for a quarter million acres from which we honor the past and, more importantly,
from which we learn and take inspiration”).
85. Proclamation No. 6920, 3 C.F.R. 64 (1996); Ranchod, supra note 84, at 556 (stating
that Grand Staircase “was the first test of the ‘national landscape monument’ concept”).
86. Janice Fried, The Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument: A Case Study in
Western Land Management, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 477, 477–78 (1998).
87. Ranchod, supra note 84, at 569; see Rasband, supra note 84, at 86 n.418 (stating that
Secretary Babbitt “himself was quite clear that [the national landscape monument concept] was a
departure from the purposes of the Antiquities Act”).
88. Ranchod, supra note 84, at 569. Consistent with President Clinton’s use of the
Antiquities Act to preserve ecosystems, BLM under President Obama considered the Act an
important tool in its “Treasured Landscapes” proposal. BLM, Discussion Paper, Treasured
Landscapes: Our Vision, Our Values (undated “Internal Draft”), at 5,
https://robbishop.house.gov/sites/robbishop.house.gov/files/migrated/UploadedPhotos/Treasure
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Before President Obama, President George W. Bush held the record
for creating the largest presidentially designated national monument: the
Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument, at a size of 89.6
million acres.89 But President Obama made President Bush and other
predecessors look like pikers. President Obama’s largest monument
designation—which expanded the Pacific Remote Islands National
Monument—exceeds 261 million acres.90 The total size of national
monument land created by President Obama exceeded 550 million
acres,91 more than twice President George W. Bush’s then-record total of
218.8 million acres.92 To put these numbers in perspective, Alaska, the
largest state, comprises about 426 million acres; Texas, the second largest
state, spans about 172 million acres.93
President Obama carried forward President Clinton’s landscapemonument concept. For example, Obama’s proclamation creating Bears
Ears calls it a “cultural landscape.”94 The proclamation specifically cites

d_Landscapes_doc.pdf; Bishop Uncovers Additional DOI Documents, Secret Strategizing, U.S.
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES: U.S. CONGRESSMAN ROB BISHOP (Aug. 17, 2010),
https://robbishop.house.gov/media/press-releases/bishop-uncovers-additional-doi-documentssecret-strategizing?DocumentID=203312 (stating that this document was leaked in February
2009). That proposal would manage 130 to 140 million acres of BLM land—“roughly equivalent
in size to Colorado and Wyoming combined . . . not as individual parcels, but as components of
larger landscapes, ecosystems, airsheds, and watersheds.” BLM, supra, at 1. The proposal would
have the President use the Antiquities Act to preserve these treasured landscapes “[s]hould the
legislative process not prove fruitful.” Id. at 5.
89. NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 74.
90. Id.
91. See Davenport, supra note 1, at 2.
92. Keith Collins, Map: Obama Established More National Monuments than Any Other
President, QUARTZ (Jan. 12, 2017), https://qz.com/881165/map-obama-established-morenational-monuments-than-any-other-president/; see Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, Obama
Names Five New National Monuments, Including Southern Civil Rights Sites, WASH. POST (Jan.
12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/obama-names-five-newnational-monuments-including-southern-civil-rights-sites/2017/01/12/7f5ce78c-d907-11e6-9a36
-1d296534b31e_story.html?utm_term=.9d98aa8eaf65. All told, presidents have created 154
monuments totaling more than 840 million acres. Collins, supra.
93. State Area Measurements and Internal Point Coordinates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/state-area.html (last updated Dec. 5, 2012).
94. Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139, 1139 (Dec. 28, 2016); see also Babbitt,
supra note 84 (arguing that the Antiquities Act should be used to protect “cultural landscape[s]”).
Overall, the proclamation refers to the Bears Ears monument as a “landscape” at least eight times.
See, e.g., Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. at 1140 (stating that traditional knowledge “is,
itself, a resource to be protected and used in understanding and managing this landscape
sustainably for generations to come” (emphasis added)); id. at 1142 (“The alcove columbine and
cave primrose, also regionally endemic, grow in seeps and hanging gardens in the Bears Ears
landscape.” (emphasis added)).
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“[t]he area’s cultural importance to Native American tribes.”95 The
proclamation identifies “[t]he traditional ecological knowledge”
developed by the tribes as “itself, a resource to be protected,” apparently
as an “object[]” protectable under the Antiquities Act.96 These portions
of the proclamation appear to reflect the view that the Antiquities Act’s
protection of “objects of historic or scientific interest”97 includes millionacre landscapes possessing cultural significance.
It is indeed the phrase “objects of historic or scientific interest”98 that
President Roosevelt and later presidents have often relied upon to create
massive monuments.99 No doubt the term “object” can, in the abstract,
refer to almost any natural or manmade creation of almost any size.100
The entire earth is an “object,” from one perspective. And few objects
utterly lack “historic or scientific interest.” But the text and history of the
Act compel a narrower understanding. By referring to “other objects of
historic and scientific interest,” the Act restricts protectable objects to
those closely akin to “historic landmarks [and] historic and prehistoric
structures.”101 At a minimum, an object should possess “extraordinary”
or “the greatest” historic or scientific value to fall within the Act,

95. Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1140; see also id. at 1139 (“[T]he land is
profoundly sacred to many Native American tribes.”).
96. Id. at 1140; 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012).
97. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976) (finding that a pool in the
Devils Hole geologic formation and its fish were “objects of historic and scientific interest”);
Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 455–56 (1920) (concluding that the Grand Canyon “is
an object of unusual scientific interest”).
100. See, e.g., Object, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
object (last updated June 3, 2018) (giving as primary definition “something material that may be
perceived by the senses”).
101. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (emphasis added). In Yates v. United States, the Court interpreted
the federal statute that makes it a crime to destroy, conceal, or alter “any record, document, or
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a federal investigation. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1519 (2012) (emphasis added); 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1085 (2015). Relying on the noscitur a sociis
and ejusdem generis canons of statutory interpretation, the Court refused to interpret the term
“tangible object” to include the undersized fish that Mr. Yates ordered his crew to destroy after
illegally catching them. See Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1085–87 (“‘Tangible object’ is the last in a list of
terms that begins ‘any record [or] document.’ The term is therefore appropriately read to refer,
not to any tangible object, but specifically to the subset of tangible objects involving records and
documents, i.e., objects used to record or preserve information.”); cf. Circuit City Stores v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112, 114–19 (2001) (interpreting phrase in Federal Arbitration Act—which
excluded “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”—to exclude only employment contracts involving
transportation workers, applying ejusdem generis canon of statutory interpretation).
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considering the Act’s original objectives.102 Otherwise, a common
arrowhead or an intriguing rock formation could be designated a national
monument.103 This plainly is not what Congress intended.104
Scholars agree that large-scale landscape-monument designations
violate the Antiquities Act’s original intent. Historian Lee wrote that as
early as 1908 the executive branch interpreted the Act to authorize the
“establishment of a much wider range of national monuments than the
framers of the act appear originally to have had in mind, judging from the
record of the hearings and related legislative history.”105 Another leading
historian of the Act, Hal Rothman, agreed that certain presidents,
beginning with Theodore Roosevelt, used the Act to establish monuments
covering “[a]reas far larger than ever conceived” by the framers of the
Act.106 Even Professor Mark Squillace, who has defended large-scale
monument designations, admits that the Act “was not necessarily
designed as a vehicle for public land preservation.”107 More than that,
Professor Squillace admits that “[m]ost commentators who have
102. See Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236, 3236 (1906) (finding that Devils Tower is
“such an extraordinary example of the effect of erosion in the higher mountains as to be a natural
wonder and an object of historic and great scientific interest,” and “the public good would be
promoted” by designating it a monument (emphasis added)); Proclamation No. 695, 34 Stat. 3264,
3264 (1906) (“[T]the rocks known as El Morro and Inscription rock . . . are of the greatest
historical value and it appears that the public good would be promoted by setting aside said
rocks . . . .” (emphasis added)); Proclamation No. 696, 34 Stat. 3265, 3265 (1906) (finding that
Montezuma castle was a prehistoric structure “of the greatest ethnological value and scientific
interest” (emphasis added)); Proclamation No. 740, 35 Stat. 2119, 2119 (1907) (finding that “the
extensive prehistoric communal or pueblo ruins in San Juan and McKinley Counties, Territory of
New Mexico” were of “extraordinary interest because of their number and their great size and
because of the innumerable and valuable relics of a prehistoric people which they contain,
and . . . that the public good would be promoted by reserving these prehistoric remains” (emphasis
added)).
103. Cf. ISE, supra note 43, at 153 (suggesting that by including “other objects of scientific
interest,” the Act encompassed fossils and other objects of paleontological value).
104. Lee, supra note 33, at 250 (stating that broad interpretation of the Act led to “a much
wider range of national monuments than the framers of the act appear originally to have in mind
judging from the record of the hearings and related legislative history”).
105. Id.
106. ROTHMAN, supra note 15, at 48; see also 1 WHEATLEY, JR., supra note 15, at 464–65,
509 (study of executive withdrawals prepared for Public Land Review Commission established
by Act of Sept. 19, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982; discussing “consistent complaint” that
Antiquities Act had been used to make withdrawals “far in excess of the amount needed to
properly administer the reserved site”).
107. Squillace, Monumental Legacy, supra note 7, at 488. Professor Squillace notes that
during the Clinton Administration, he worked with Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt “in the
development of a myriad of monument proposals that were pending before the Administration.”
Id. at 473 n.*. Professor Squillace “is generally supportive of the expansive monument
proclamations” made by President Clinton and other presidents. Harmon et al., Introduction: The
Importance of the Antiquities Act, in THE ANTIQUITIES ACT, supra note 12, at 1, 9.
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considered the Act and its legislative history have concluded that it was
designed to protect only very small tracts of land around archeological
sites.”108 Indeed, that view appears to be nearly unanimous among
commentators.109
Given certain presidents’ disregard of the Act’s original intent, it is no
wonder Congress has repeatedly considered bills amending the Act.110
108. Squillace, Monumental Legacy, supra note 7, at 477.
109. Getches, supra note 15, at 301–02 (stating that, despite Jimmy Carter’s designations of
multi-million-acre national monuments, “Congress did not have in mind authorizing withdrawals
of vast areas for designation as national monuments when it passed the Antiquities Act”);
Johannsen, supra note 20, at 450 (“Congress . . . intended to limit the creation of national
monuments to small reservations surrounding specific ‘objects.’”); Christine A. Klein, Preserving
Monumental Landscapes Under the Antiquities Act, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1333, 1334 (2002)
(stating that “Congress intended [in the Antiquities Act] simply to protect the nation’s
archaeological treasures from looting in order to preserve relics such as prehistoric pottery shards,
burial mounds, and cliff dwellings,” but some presidents, including Theodore Roosevelt, “had a
more grandiose view” of the Act); John Copeland Nagle, Wilderness Exceptions, 44 ENVTL. L.
373, 377 (2014) (“The original intent of the enactors of the Antiquities Act was . . . [t]o preserve
the relics of the ancient tribes of the Southwest.”); Rasband, supra note 7, at 628 (“Everyone who
has studied the legislative history of the Antiquities Act concedes that Congress did not intend the
Act to authorize broad landscape-level withdrawals.”); Rasband, supra note 25, at 501 (“[T]he
Antiquities Act, as initially enacted, was intended to allow the President to make only small
withdrawals of public lands in order to protect prehistoric ruins and Indian artifacts.”); Robert W.
Righter, National Monuments to National Parks: The Use of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 20 W.
HIST. Q. 281, 284 (1989) (stating that President Carter’s establishment of seventeen national
monuments in Alaska totaling 56 million acres was “certainly not what the critics or framers of
the Antiquities Act had in mind”); Rusnak, supra note 13, at 675 (“[T]he purpose of the proposed
bill [that became the Antiquities Act] was to protect American Indian ruins in the western United
States by creating small reservations of the least amount of land necessary to preserve certain
‘relics of prehistoric times.’”); Shepherd, supra 13, at 4–9 (“[T]he legislative history [of the
Antiquities Act] reveals that Congress had a limited purpose in mind: protection of small areas in
the southwest United States containing prehistoric ruins and Indian artifacts.”); id. at 4–41 (“[T]he
Antiquities Act, as it has been applied and interpreted over the years, has gone far beyond its
original intent.”).
110. E.g., Marine Access and State Transparency Act, H.R. 1489, 115th Cong. § 2
(introduced Mar. 9, 2017) (proposing to amend Antiquities Act to require congressional approval
and NEPA compliance before President can create a national monument); Ensuring Public
Involvement in the Creation of National Monuments Act, H.R. 1459, 113th Cong. § 2 (engrossed
in House Mar. 27, 2014) (proposing to amend the Act to provide: “No more than one declaration
shall be made in a State during any presidential four-year term of office without an express Act
of Congress”); H.R. 250, 113th Cong. § 1 (introduced Jan. 15, 2013) (proposing to amend the
Antiquities Act to require congressional approval of national monuments designated by
President); H.R. 817, 112th Cong. § 1 (introduced Feb. 18, 2011) (similar proposal); National
Monument Fairness Act, H.R. 2386, 108th Cong. § 2 (introduced June 5, 2003) (proposing to
amend the Antiquities Act to make President’s designation of any national monument exceeding
50,000 acres effective for only two years unless approved by Act of Congress); National
Monument Fairness Act, H.R. 2114, 107th Cong. § 2 (introduced June 7, 2001) (similar); National
Monument Accountability Act, H.R. 4121, 106th Cong. § 2 (introduced Mar. 29, 2000)
(proposing to amend the Antiquities Act to make President’s designation of national monuments
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Though these efforts have failed, they preclude any argument that
Congress has acquiesced in presidential violations of the Act. 111 What is
more, their failure shows that, regarding congressional efforts to address
certain presidents’ abuses of the Antiquities Act, presidents have a
decided advantage. The President can operate unilaterally under the Act.
The President need not consult anyone. The President need not follow
any procedures whatsoever.112 The President is as free as a cowboy.
Congress, in contrast, suffers under the deliberative majoritarian process
that defines representative democracy. In light of the President’s
comparative advantages in abusing power, compared to Congress’s
ability to curb those abuses, there is a strong argument that the
appropriate remedy for one President’s abuse of power under the
Antiquities Act lies in the hands of the President’s successor. The next
two Parts of this Article discuss the legal authority supporting such a
remedy and respectively address the President’s power to reduce and to
abolish monuments created under the Antiquities Act.113

effective for only two years unless approved by Congress); National Monument Fairness Act of
1997, H.R. 1127, 105th Cong. § 2 (engrossed in House Oct. 7, 1997) (proposing to amend the
Antiquities Act to provide for expiration after two years, in the absence of congressional approval,
of any proclamation “that results in the designation of a total acreage in excess of 50,000 acres in
a single State in a single calendar year”); National Monument Fairness Act of 1997, S. 477, 105th
Cong. § 2 (introduced Mar. 19, 1997) (proposing to amend the Antiquities Act to require Act of
Congress for creation of any national monument of more than 5,000 acres); H.R. 4118, 104th
Cong. § 1 (introduced Sept. 19, 1996) (similar proposal).
111. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (relying partly on
congressional acquiescence to uphold president’s power to make executive agreements to settle
claims against foreign entities).
112. See Shepherd, supra note 13, at 4–9.
113. Besides Congress, courts have reviewed actions claiming that the President’s creation
of a monument violated the Antiquities Act. The courts have rejected those challenges,
emphasizing the President’s broad discretion under the Act. See, e.g., Mountain States Legal
Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 812 (2003); Tulare
Cty. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 813 (2003); Anaconda
Copper Co. v. Andrus, No. A79-161, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17861, at *5–6 (D. Alaska June 26,
1980); Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 895–97 (D. Wyo. 1945); see also Cameron v. United
States, 252 U.S. 450, 454, 455–56 (1920) (discussing an action by the United States to enjoin
defendant from use of land within grand Canyon National Monument, rejecting defendant’s
argument that President lacked authority to create the monument, and agreeing with President’s
determination that Grand Canyon “is an object of unusual scientific interest”); Utah Ass’n of Ctys.
v. Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1183 (D. Utah 2004) (finding in favor of the monument creation
because the President acted under and in compliance with the Antiquities Act). As discussed in
Part III, the “discretion” that the Antiquities Act confers on the President should vest in the current
President, so that the Act accords with the general rule preventing the President from being bound
by the acts of his predecessors. Per this interpretation, the President can modify or abolish a
monument established under the Act regardless of whether a judicial challenge to the monument
would have succeeded.
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II. THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO MODIFY A MONUMENT CREATED
UNDER THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
The President’s power to modify a monument previously established
under the Antiquities Act is established by (A) presidential practice; (B)
Congress’s acquiescence in presidential modifications; and (C) official
executive-branch opinions endorsing the president’s modification power.
Each is discussed below.
A. Presidential Practice Under the Antiquities Act
Presidents began modifying national monuments created by prior
presidents soon after passage of the Antiquities Act, and the practice has
continued into modern times. These modifications have included (1) the
exclusion of land originally reserved for the monuments and (2) the
relaxation of restrictions imposed in the original proclamation.
Presidents have excluded land originally included in a monument
eighteen times over fifty years.114 The earliest exclusion occurred in
1911, when President William H. Taft reduced (by more than 40%) the
Petrified Forest National Monument established by President Theodore
Roosevelt five years earlier.115 The most recent exclusion occurred in
1963, when President John F. Kennedy modified the boundaries of
Bandelier National Monument.116 It does not appear that any of these
modifications has ever been judicially challenged. Their number and
regularity led a Congressional Research Service Report to conclude:
114. Proclamation No. 1167, 37 Stat. 1716 (1911) (regarding Petrified Forest Nat’l
Monument); Proclamation No. 1186, 37 Stat. 1733 (1912) (regarding Navajo Nat’l Monument);
Proclamation No. 1191, 37 Stat. 1737 (1912) (regarding Mount Olympus Nat’l Monument);
Proclamation No. 1293, 39 Stat. 1726 (1915) (regarding Mount Olympus Nat’l Monument);
Proclamation No. 1862, 45 Stat. 2984 (1929) (regarding Mount Olympus Nat’l Monument);
Proclamation No. 2295, 3 C.F.R. 46 (1938–1943) (regarding White Sands Nat’l Monument);
Proclamation No. 2393, 3 C.F.R. 150 (1938–1943) (regarding Grand Canyon Nat’l Monument);
Proclamation No. 2454, 3 C.F.R. 208 (1938–1943) (regarding Wupatki Nat’l Monument);
Proclamation No. 2499, 3 C.F.R. 243 (1938–1943) (regarding Craters of the Moon Nat’l
Monument); Proclamation No. 2659, 3 C.F.R. 63 (1943–1948) (regarding Santa Rosa Island Nat’l
Monument); Proclamation No. 3089, 3 C.F.R. 36 (1954–1958) (regarding Glacier Bay Nat’l
Monument); Proclamation No. 3132, 3 C.F.R. 70 (1954–1958) (regarding Hovenweep Nat’l
Monument); Proclamation No. 3138, 3 C.F.R. 73 (1954–1958) (regarding Great Sand Dunes Nat’l
Monument); Proclamation No. 3307, 3 C.F.R. 44 (1959–1963) (regarding Colorado Nat’l
Monument); Proclamation No. 3344, 3 C.F.R. 74 (1959–1963) (regarding Black Canyon of the
Gunnison Nat’l Monument); Proclamation No. 3360, 3 C.F.R. 83 (1959–1963) (regarding Arches
Nat’l Monument); Proclamation No. 3486, 3 C.F.R. 213 (1959–1963) (regarding Natural Bridges
Nat’l Monument); Proclamation No. 3539, 3 C.F.R. 287 (1959–1963) (regarding Bandelier Nat’l
Monument).
115. Proclamation No. 1167, 37 Stat. 1716 (1911); NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 74.
116. Proclamation No. 3539, 3 C.F.R. 287, 288 (1959–1963).
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“That a President can modify a previous Presidentially-created
monument seems clear.”117
The proclamations excluding lands that were originally included
within monument boundaries reflect the breadth of the President’s
modification power. Several exclusions rested on a later President’s
determination that the original proclamations reserved more land than
necessary, and therefore violated the Antiquities Act’s requirement that
land reserved for monuments “be confined to the smallest area
compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be
protected.”118 At least two proclamations excluded lands that, a later
President determined, contained no objects of historical or scientific
interest and had therefore been erroneously included in the original
proclamation.119 Still other exclusions reflected changed circumstances.
For example, one proclamation excluded monument land that had been
included in the original proclamation but was later made into an
airfield.120 Other proclamations excluded lands that no longer contained

117. PAMELA BALDWIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20647, AUTHORITY OF A PRESIDENT TO
MODIFY OR ELIMINATE A NATIONAL MONUMENT 5 (2000), http://congressionalresearch.com/
RS20647/document.php?study=Authority+of+a+President+to+Modify+or+Eliminate+a+Nation
al+Monument.
118. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b) (2012). For example, President William H. Taft reduced the
Petrified Forest National Monument in 1911 because the original proclamation “has been found,
through a careful geological survey of its deposits of mineralized forest remains, to reserve a much
larger area of land than is necessary to protect the objects for which the Monument was created.”
Proclamation No. 1167, 37 Stat. 1716, 1716 (1911). Similarly, President Taft reduced the Navajo
National Monument in 1912 because, “after careful examination and survey of the prehistoric cliff
dwelling pueblo ruins, [the original proclamation] has been found to reserve a much larger tract
of land than is necessary for the protection of such of the ruins as should be reserved.”
Proclamation No. 1186, 37 Stat. 1733, 1733 (1912). In 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
reduced the second Grand Canyon National Monument finding that certain lands originally
reserved “are not necessary for the proper care and management of the objects of scientific interest
situated on the lands within the said monument.” Proclamation No. 2393, 3 C.F.R. 150, 151
(1938–1943). President Dwight D. Eisenhower altered the boundaries of the Colorado National
Monument in 1959 to exclude “certain lands which are not necessary for the proper care,
management, and protection of the objects of scientific interest situated on the lands within the
monument.” Proclamation No. 3307, 3 C.F.R. 44, 44 (1959–1963).
119. In 1956, President Eisenhower altered the boundaries of Hovenweep National
Monument to exclude certain lands that, he determined, “contain no objects of historic or
scientific interest [and] were erroneously included in” the original proclamation. Proclamation
No. 3132, 3 C.F.R. 70, 70 (1954–1958). Similarly, President Eisenhower modified Arches
National Monument in 1960 to exclude “certain lands in the southeast section thereof, contiguous
to the Salt Wash escarpment, which are used for grazing and which have no known scenic or
scientific value.” Proclamation No. 3360, 3 C.F.R. 83, 83 (1951–1963).
120. President Eisenhower reduced Glacier Bay National Park in 1955 because certain lands
were “now being used as an airfield for national-defense purposes and are no longer suitable for
national-monument purposes” and other lands were “suitable for a limited type of agricultural use
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antiquities or that were no longer needed to protect the antiquity that the
monument was created to protect.121 Others rested on a later President’s
determination that it was in the public interest to remove land from a
monument so it could be put to different uses.122 Perhaps most
significantly, some proclamations reducing monuments contained no
justification whatsoever.123 Together, the many proclamations excluding
lands from monuments reflect that a president can reduce the size of a
monument established under the Antiquities Act.
Although some scholars argue the President can expand monuments
but not reduce them,124 that argument ignores real-world practice: Some
proclamations excluding lands from prior presidentially established
and are no longer necessary for the proper care and management of the objects of scientific interest
on the lands within the monument.” Proclamation No. 3089, 3 C.F.R. 36, 36 (1954–1958).
121. President Eisenhower excluded certain land from the Great Sand Dunes National
Monument in 1956, concluding that the land was no longer necessary for “the preservation of the
great sand dunes and additional features of scenic, scientific, and educational interests,” and that
it was “in the public interest to exclude such lands from the monument.” Proclamation No. 3138,
3 C.F.R. 73, 73 (1954–1958). President Eisenhower modified the Black Canyon of the Gunnison
National Monument in 1960 to exclude lands that, he found, were “no longer required for the
proper care, protection, and management of the objects of scientific interest situated on lands
within the monument.” Proclamation No. 3344, 3 C.F.R. 74, 74 (1959–1963). President John F.
Kennedy modified the Natural Bridges National Monument in 1962 to “exclude from the
monument approximately three hundred and twenty acres of land, known as Snow Flat Spring
Cave and Cigarette Spring Cave, which no longer contain features of archeological value and are
not needed for the proper care, management, protection, interpretation, and preservation of the
monument.” Proclamation No. 3486, 3 C.F.R. 213, 213 (1959–1963). In 1963, President Kennedy
diminished Bandelier National Monument in 1963 to “exclude . . . approximately 3,925 acres of
land containing limited archeological values which have been fully researched.” Proclamation
No. 3539, 3 C.F.R. 287, 288 (1959–1963).
122. In 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt excluded land originally reserved in the White
Sands National Monument that was on the United States Highway Route 70 right of way, finding
the exclusion to be “in the public interest.” Proclamation No. 2295, 3 C.F.R. 46, 46 (1938–1943).
President Roosevelt similarly, in 1941, reduced the Craters of the Moon National Monument
finding that the excluded land was “needed for the construction of Idaho State Highway No. 22.”
Proclamation No. 2499, 3 C.F.R. 243, 243 (1938–1943). Also in 1941, President Roosevelt
reduced the Wupatki National Monument to exclude land “needed in the construction and
operation of a diversion dam in Little Colorado River to facilitate the irrigation of lands on the
Navajo Indian Reservation.” Proclamation No. 2454, 3 C.F.R. 208, 208 (1938–1943). President
Harry Truman diminished the Santa Rosa Island National Monument based on his determination
that the land was “needed by the War Department for military purposes” and that “elimination of
such lands from the national monument would not seriously interfere with its administration.”
Proclamation No. 2659, 3 C.F.R. 63, 63 (1943–1948).
123. In 1915, President Woodrow Wilson reduced the Mount Olympus National Monument
by about 50% of its original size, without any explanation. Proclamation No. 1293, 39 Stat. 1726,
1726 (1915); NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 74. President Calvin Coolidge further reduced the
monument in 1929, again without explanation. Proclamation No. 1862, 45 Stat. 2984, 2985
(1929).
124. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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monuments have, at the same time, added other lands to the monument.
For example, President Dwight D. Eisenhower altered the boundaries of
the Colorado National Monument in 1959 to exclude “certain lands which
are not necessary for the proper care, management, and protection of the
objects of scientific interest situated on the lands within the
monument.”125 In the same proclamation, President Eisenhower added
other lands to the monument, finding that they were “needed . . . for the
proper care, management, and protection of the objects of scientific
interest situated on lands now within the monument.”126 Likewise,
President Eisenhower altered the boundaries of the Glacier Bay National
Monument to exclude some land while adding other land.127 In 1963,
President Kennedy modified the Bandelier National Monument in New
Mexico, finding that it “would be in the public interest to exclude” 3,925
acres “containing limited archeological values which have been fully
researched and are not needed to complete the interpretive story of
the . . . Monument.”128 At the same time, President Kennedy found that it
“would be in the public interest to add” 2,882 other acres, “the
preservation of which would implement the purposes of such
monument.”129 These examples show the need for, and the common sense
of, the President’s ability to adjust monument boundaries to reflect his or
her determination of what is proper under the Antiquities Act.
Presidential modifications have included not only changes to the size
of monuments, but also changes in their management and relaxation of
restrictions in the original proclamation. In 1929, for example, President
Herbert Hoover transferred responsibility for managing the Bandelier
National Monument from the Forest Service to the Park Service.130 Only
later did Congress pass a Reorganization Act expressly authorizing such
transfers.131 In 1936, President Franklin D. Roosevelt relaxed restrictions
on the Katmai National Monument to make the original reservation of
land for the monument “subject to valid claims under the public-land
laws.”132 Presidents have also modified prior presidentially established
monument to exclude land covered by a right of way within the
monuments.133
In short, presidents of both parties have added land, subtracted land,
and made other changes to monuments established under the Antiquities
125. Proclamation No. 3307, 3 C.F.R. 56, 56 (1959–1963).
126. Id.
127. Proclamation No. 3089, 3 C.F.R. 36, 36 (1954–1958).
128. Proclamation No. 3539, 3 C.F.R. 287, 288 (1959–1963).
129. Id. at 287–88.
130. Proclamation No. 1990, 47 Stat. 2503, 2504 (1932).
131. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 212, tit. IV, § 401, 47 Stat. 1489, 1517.
132. Proclamation No. 2176, 49 Stat. 3523, 3523 (1936).
133. Proclamation No. 2295, 3 C.F.R. 46, 46 (1938–1943) (White Sands Nat’l Monument);
Proclamation No. 2499, 3 C.F.R. 243, 243 (1938–1943) (Craters of the Moon Nat’l Monument).
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Act. Presidential practice thus strongly suggests that the Act gives the
President broad power to modify monuments established under it,
including by reducing their size.
B. Congressional Acquiescence
Because presidents have repeatedly diminished monuments
established under the Antiquities Act and also relaxed original
restrictions on their use, it is clear that presidents have interpreted the Act
to impliedly grant them this modification power. In this situation, it is
significant that Congress has never restricted the President’s modification
power.134 To be sure, the U.S. Supreme Court has often warned against
drawing inferences from mere congressional inaction.135 But that warning
does not apply here.
Here we have more than “mere congressional silence and
passivity.”136 While Congress has been silent about presidential
modification of prior presidentially established monuments, Congress has
regularly addressed presidents’ creation of national monuments.137 For
example, Congress has abolished ten presidentially established
monuments.138 In addition, after Congress was unsuccessful in abolishing
134. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
135. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600 (1983) (stating that “[n]onaction
by Congress is not often a useful guide” to statutory interpretation). Compare SEC v. Sloan, 436
U.S. 103, 121 (1978) (rejecting congressional acquiescence argument), with Saxbe v. Bustos, 419
U.S. 65, 74 (1974) (accepting congressional acquiescence argument).
136. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972).
137. Three scholars have referred to “the controversy that has swirled around the
[Antiquities] Act throughout its history: whether the scope of discretionary proclamations as
exercised by various presidents has far exceeded what was intended by Congress.” Harmon et al.,
supra note 107, at 1.
138. Squillace, Monumental Legacy, supra note 7, at 550 n.453 (stating that Congress has
abolished ten national monuments established under Antiquities Act); see Act of Dec. 19, 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-550, § 601, 94 Stat. 3221, 3231 (abolishing Gran Quivira National Monument and
including its land in statutorily created Salinas National Monument); Act of Aug. 1, 1956, Pub.
L. No. 84-891, ch. 846, 70 Stat. 898 (abolishing Fossil Cycad National Monument); Act of July
30, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-846, ch. 790, § 1, 70 Stat. 730 (abolishing Verendrye National
Monument and conveying its lands to North Dakota for state historic site); Act of July 26, 1955,
Pub. L. No. 84-179, ch. 387, 69 Stat. 380 (abolishing Old Kasaan National Monument and
incorporating it into Tongass National Forest); Act of May 17, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-360, ch. 203,
68 Stat. 98 (abolishing Shoshone Cavern National Monument and conveying land to Cody,
Wyoming, “for public recreational use”); Act of Aug. 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-652, ch. 534, 64
Stat. 405 (abolishing Wheeler National Monument and providing that its lands were to be
administered as part of national forest in which it was located); Act of Aug. 3, 1950, Pub. L. No.
81-648, ch. 530, 64 Stat. 404 (abolishing Holy Cross National Monument and providing that its
lands were to be administered as part of national forest in which it was located); Act of Sept. 7,
1949, Pub. L. No. 81-292, ch. 542, 63 Stat. 691 (abolishing Fort Niagara National Monument and
conveying it to New York State for use as state park); Act of July 30, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-564,
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the Jackson Hole National Monument—because of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s veto of the bill abolishing it—Congress refused to
appropriate funds for administering the monument and ultimately
amended the Antiquities Act to prohibit the President from designating
additional monuments in Wyoming.139 More recently, Congress
rescinded massive monument designations that President Jimmy Carter
made in Alaska.140 At the same time, Congress restricted future
presidential withdrawals of land in Alaska.141 Besides such legislation,
many bills have been proposed in Congress to limit the President’s power
to create national monuments.142
Of course, Congress has also effectively ratified some presidentially
established monuments by adding to them or converting them into
national parks.143 But this is just to say that Congress has paid careful,
continuing attention to the President’s exercise of power under the
Antiquities Act. For this reason, it is significant that Congress has never
restricted or proposed to restrict the President’s power to modify prior
presidentially established monuments.144
ch. 699, 60 Stat 712 (abolishing Santa Rosa Island National Monument and conveying it to
Escambia County, Florida); Act of Apr. 7, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-92, ch. 107, 46 Stat. 142, 142
(abolishing Papago Saguaro National Monument and reserving some of its lands for military
purposes while transferring remainder to City of Tempe and State of Arizona); see also Act of
Aug. 24, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-343, ch. 741, 50 Stat. 746, 746–47 (transferring land in Lewis and
Clark Cavern National Monument to Montana); NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 74 (showing
Congress abolishing a national monument at item thirteen on monument list).
139. 16 U.S.C. § 431a (2012); see Rasband, supra note 25, at 502 n.90 (discussing President
Roosevelt vetoing the bill abolishing the monument and Congress’s subsequent defiance);
Righter, supra note 109, at 295–96 (discussing Congress’s reaction to President Roosevelt
creating the Jackson Hole National Monument).
140. 16 U.S.C. § 3209 (2012); Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1065–66 (2016); Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.) (rescinding President Carter’s monument
designations by statutorily reserving substantially the same land that had been covered by
President Carter’s designations). But cf. John D. Leshy, Shaping the Modern West: The Role of
the Executive Branch, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 287, 299 (2001) (characterizing the Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act as ratifying and endorsing President Carter’s designations).
141. 16 U.S.C. § 3213(a) (2012).
142. See Rusnak, supra note 13, at 691.
143. E.g., Act of Dec. 19, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-550, § 502(a), 94 Stat. 3221, 3227 (abolishing
Chaco Canyon National Monument and creating Chaco Culture National Historical Park); Act of
Mar. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-358, 72 Stat. 69 (establishing Petrified Forest National Monument
as national park); Act of Feb. 26, 1919, Pub. L. No. 65-277, § 9, 40 Stat. 1175, 1178 (designating
Grand Canyon National Monument as a national park).
144. Several Congressional Research Service reports have discussed the President’s
modification power. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44687,
ANTIQUITIES ACT: SCOPE OF AUTHORITY FOR MODIFICATION OF NATIONAL MONUMENTS 4–6
(2016), http://www.law.indiana.edu/publicland/files/national_monuments_modifications_
CRS.pdf; CAROL HARDY VINCENT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44687, NATIONAL MONUMENTS AND

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss3/2

28

Seamon: Dismantling Monuments

2018]

DISMANTLING MONUMENTS

581

This is not a situation of congressional acquiescence in a mere
“administrative practice,”145 for it does not involve merely a federal
agency’s view of its statutory powers. Instead, it involves the views of
multiple presidents. This matters because the President, alone in the
Executive Branch, has the duty to “take [c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully
executed.”146 Moreover, the official actions of a President, unlike those
of an administrative agency, cannot fly under the radar screen.147 Finally,
the President, unlike the federal agencies, is Congress’s co-equal, a status
that makes it appropriate to presume congressional awareness of the
President’s view of his power under Acts of Congress. 148 These
differences between the President and the federal bureaucracy supply
strong reasons to believe that Congress is aware of, and has acquiesced
in, presidents’ repeated exercise of power to modify prior presidentially
created monuments, including by reducing their size.149
The significance of congressional acquiescence in the present
situation is supported by United States v. Jackson.150 In Jackson, the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed whether a 1906 Act of Congress authorized the
President, by executive order, to restrict the sale or other alienation of
lands held by Native Americans under the homestead laws.151 The 1906
Act expressly authorized the President to restrict the alienation rights of
Native American “allottees”—meaning, the Chief Justice explained,
Native Americans “who received [land] patents under the General
Allotment Act of February 8, 1887.”152 But the 1906 Act did not
ANTIQUITIES ACT (Sept. 7, 2016); CAROL HARDY VINCENT & PAMELA BALDWIN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL30528, NATIONAL MONUMENTS AND THE ANTIQUITIES ACT: RECENT
DESIGNATIONS AND ISSUES 20 (2001), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs1462/
m1/1/high_res_d/RL30528_2001Jan15.pdf.
145. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933) (“True
indeed it is that administrative practice does not avail to overcome a statute so plain in its
commands as to leave nothing for construction. True it also is that administrative practice,
consistent and generally unchallenged, will not be overturned except for very cogent reasons if
the scope of the command is indefinite and doubtful.”).
146. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
147. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749, 752–53 (1982) (relying in part on “the sheer
prominence of the President’s office” in holding that the President has absolute immunity from
civil actions based on his official actions).
148. Id. at 750 (“The President’s unique status under the Constitution distinguishes him from
other executive officials.”).
149. Cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (“[A] systematic, unbroken,
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before
questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of
Art. II.”) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
150. 280 U.S. 183 (1930).
151. Id. at 186.
152. Id. at 185.
THE
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expressly authorize alienation restrictions on Native American
homesteaders.153 The lower federal court had held that “since the
language of the [1906 Act] refers only to Indian allottees, it cannot be
considered as authorizing the President to continue restrictions on
alienation in patents issued to Indian homesteaders.”154 The Court
rejected that interpretation, however, based on the longstanding view of
the executive branch—undisturbed by Congress—that, for purposes of
the 1906 Act and similar statutes, the term “allottees” included
homesteaders.155
So too here, presidents have long exercised power to modify
monuments established under the Antiquities Act. Congress has not
disturbed that power, despite continuing close attention to presidential
exercises of power under the Act. The presidential practice and
congressional acceptance of that practice powerfully support the
conclusion that the Antiquities Act authorizes the President to modify
monuments established under the Act.
C. Official Executive Opinions
Official opinions in the executive branch confirm that the President
can modify monuments established under the Antiquities Act, including
by reducing them. These opinions come from the Attorney General of the
United States and the Solicitor of the U.S. Department of the Interior.156
In a 1938 opinion, Attorney General Homer Cummings recognized
that “the President from time to time has diminished the area of national
monuments established under the Antiquities Act by removing or
excluding lands therefrom.”157 General Cummings tied the President’s
assertion of diminution power to the Antiquities Act’s requirement that
land reserved for a national monument “be confined to the smallest area
compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be

153. Act of June 21, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-258, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 325, 326 (quoted in relevant
part in Jackson, 280 U.S. at 190).
154. Jackson, 280 U.S. at 191 (paraphrasing district court’s holding).
155. Id. at 196–97 (“If there were any doubt on the question, the silence of Congress in the
face of the long continued practice of the Department of the Interior . . . must be considered as
‘equivalent to consent to continue the practice until the power was revoked by some subsequent
action by Congress.’”).
156. See 28 U.S.C. § 511 (2012) (“The Attorney General shall give his advice and opinion
on questions of law when required by the President.”); 43 U.S.C. § 1455 (2012) (“The legal work
of the Department of the Interior shall be performed under the supervision and direction of the
Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, who shall be appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate.”).
157. 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 185, 188 (1938).
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protected.”158 Although General Cummings did not endorse the
President’s diminution power, nor did he deny it.159
But Solicitors of the Interior have affirmed that the President does
have power to diminish monuments established under the Antiquities
Act. In 1948, Solicitor Mastin White advised that the Jackson Hole
National Monument “may be reduced by Executive action.”160 In so
advising, he relied on a 1935 Solicitor’s opinion to the same effect.161
Like Attorney General Cummings’s 1938 opinion, these Solicitors’
opinions tied the President’s power to reduce monuments to the
Antiquities Act’s requirement that land reserved for a monument “in all
cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper
care and management of the objects to be protected.”162
D. Summary
The Antiquities Act does not expressly authorize the President to
reduce a national monument established by a prior President. But it is
hard to imagine stronger circumstances supporting the conclusion that it
impliedly does so. Presidents began relying on the Act to reduce
monuments established by their predecessors soon after the Act became
law, and continued to do so for the next fifty years. These presidential
reductions never once prompted a legal challenge, and Congress
apparently knew of them yet did nothing to disturb them. An Attorney
General recognized, without reservation, the President’s exercise of
158. Id.
159. Id.; see 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b) (2012). While not addressing the president’s power to
diminish a national monument created under the Antiquities Act, General Cummings did conclude
that the President could not abolish a monument under the Act. 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 185, 189 (1938).
160. National Monuments, 60 Interior Dec. 9, 10 (July 21, 1947).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 9, 10 (reaffirming 1935 opinion concluding that the “President was authorized to
reduce the area of a national monument”); see also Squillace, The Monumental Legacy, supra
note 7, at 559–60 (discussing 1924 Solicitor opinion that concluded President could not reduce
national monument but that was reversed by later Solicitor opinions of 1935 and 1947). Professor
Squillace admits that a President can correct “mistake[s]” in monument designations made by
predecessors. See Squillace, Monumental Legacy, supra note 7, at 567; see also Proclamation No.
1322, 39 Stat. 1764 (1916) (revising boundaries in light of resurvey); ISE, supra note 43, at 157
(explaining that President Wilson issued a proclamation to replace earlier one establishing Natural
Bridges National Monument because of errors in original survey). Professor Squillace does not
explain, however, why the Antiquities Act should be interpreted implicitly to allow the President
to correct “mistakes” of his predecessors but not to allow the President to correct other erroneous
determinations made in establishing a monument under the Act. For example, Professor Squillace
does not explain why a President cannot modify a prior monument designation if the President
determines that the prior designation is “confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper
care and management of the objects to be protected.” 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b). This would seem to
be a “mistake” that the Act impliedly authorizes the President to correct.
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reduction power. Solicitors of the Interior squarely upheld that power.
Collectively, these circumstances compel the conclusion that the
Antiquities Act authorizes the President to reduce national monuments.163
III. THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO ABOLISH A MONUMENT CREATED
UNDER THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
The Antiquities Act authorizes the President to “declare” national
monuments and “reserve” public land as a part of those monuments.164
The Act neither expressly authorizes nor expressly bars the President
from abolishing a previously established monument. Even so, for three
reasons the Act should be interpreted to impliedly authorize abolition.
First, the President’s power under the Act to abolish an improperly
established monument flows logically from the President’s wellestablished power under the Act to modify a monument to exclude, for
example, land that was improperly included within the original
monument boundaries. Second, interpreting the Act to authorize abolition
enables the President to carry out the constitutional duty to take care that
the Antiquities Act is faithfully executed. That is because an improperly
established monument constitutes an ongoing violation of the Act; by
rescinding that monument, the President stops the violation. Third,
interpreting the Antiquities Act to confer abolition power accords with
the general rule that a prior president cannot tie the hands of the current
President.165
A. The Power to Reduce Implies the Power to Rescind
As described above, presidents have regularly modified monuments
previously established under the Antiquities Act to exclude land
originally included within monument boundaries.166 The well-established
existence of this modification power supports the President’s power to
abolish altogether a monument that the President determines was
improperly established in the first place. This follows as a matter of logic.
163. Cf. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699–700 (1978) (referring to the
Court’s prior decisions holding that “Congress, in giving the President the power to reserve
portions of the federal domain for specific federal purposes, impliedly authorized him to reserve
‘appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the
reservation.’” (emphasis omitted)).
164. 54 U.S.C. §§ 320301(a)–(b).
165. Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate
Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 300 (“Article II of the Constitution
vests significant discretionary authority in the President . . . . By ‘the President’ the Constitution
of course means the incumbent; the powers of the office cannot be exercised by former holders of
the office.”); Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 7, at 8–9.
166. Supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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Take the instances in which presidents have modified monuments to
exclude land that they determined was improperly included in the first
place—for example, because it neither contained protectable objects nor
was necessary to protect them.167 If the President can reduce a monument
to exclude lands that the President determines were not properly included
in the first place, logic compels the conclusion that the President can
abolish a monument that the President determines was not properly
created in the first place—say, because it did not contain antiquities
entitled to protection under the Act. Whether diminishing a monument or
abolishing it, the President exercises discretion to revisit—and, by his or
her lights, correct—a determination made by a predecessor. It is hard to
conceive of a basis for distinguishing a current President’s power to make
a correction that affects part of a monument from the President’s power
to make a correction affecting the monument as a whole.168
As discussed above, presidents have revised the boundaries of
national monuments established under the Antiquities Act not only to
correct errors in the original proclamations but also to reflect changed
circumstances.169 To recall one example, President Kennedy excluded
almost 4,000 acres from Bandelier National Monument in 1963 because
that land’s archeological values “have been fully researched.”170 If
President Kennedy’s action was warranted with respect to a portion of
the monument, logically the President should be able to eliminate an
entire monument if all of its archeological values have been exhausted.
Indeed, this was the view of Edgar Lee Hewett, the archeologist who
drafted the bill that Congress enacted as the Antiquities Act “without
changing a word.”171 In the memorandum that Hewett gave Congress
cataloging specific archeological ruins in the Southwest, he wrote that
while some should be incorporated into permanent national parks,
[m]any others should be temporarily withdrawn and allowed
to revert to the public domain after the ruins thereon have
been examined by competent authority, the collections
therefrom properly cared for, and all data that can be secured
made a matter of permanent record.172
167. See supra notes 118–19119 and accompanying text.
168. Squillace, Monumental Legacy, supra note 7, at 551 (“Whether a future President has
the authority to abolish a national monument arguably resolves the question as to whether a
President may reduce the size of a national monument or eliminate restrictions or conditions
included in the proclamation, since the legal issues are essentially the same.”).
169. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
170. Proclamation No. 3539, 3 C.F.R. 287, 288 (1959–1963).
171. Thompson, supra note 58, at 43.
172. EDGAR LEE HEWETT, MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE HISTORIC AND PREHISTORIC
RUINS OF ARIZONA, NEW MEXICO, COLORADO, AND UTAH, AND THEIR PRESERVATION, reproduced
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Thus, Hewett, the architect of the Antiquities Act, believed that some
national monuments should be abolished in their entirety, and
undoubtedly drafted the Act to authorize the President to do so.
Hewett’s view is eminently rational. Indeed, one commentator has
said that Hewett’s recognition that “once a site has given up its
information, it no longer needs to be preserved” has been “of inestimable
value to archeology ever since.”173 This commentator explained:
[Hewett’s view] has enabled archeologists to relate in a
rational way to economic and political realities, because they
do not have to insist on saving “everything.” They can focus
instead on recovering the information that makes the ruins
valuable in the first place.174
In short, the same considerations that support the President’s power to
diminish a monument established under the Antiquities Act support the
President’s power to abolish it.
B. The President’s Duty to Take Care that the Antiquities Act Be
Faithfully Executed
When a president establishes a national monument in violation of the
Antiquities Act, that violation continues as long as the monument exists.
The Constitution’s Take Care Clause gives the President a duty to ensure
that federal law is being faithfully executed during his or her watch.175
Consistent with that duty, the Antiquities Act should be interpreted to
allow the President to revise or abolish national monuments to stop the
ongoing violation of that Act.
The Take Care Clause says that the President “shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.”176 The Clause does not just require the
President him- or herself to execute the laws faithfully but also to “take
care” that they “be faithfully executed” by everyone responsible for their
execution.177 Thus, the Clause makes the President responsible for
ongoing violations of federal law by executive officials even if the
President did not cause them.178 In this way, the Take Care Clause gives
and incorporated in H.R. REP. NO. 59-2224, at 3 (1906). Hewett prepared this memorandum in
1904, at the request of William Afton Richards, then Commissioner of the General Land Office
in the Department of Interior. ROTHMAN, supra note 15, at 43; Thompson, supra note 58, at 39.
173. Thompson, supra note 58, at 45.
174. Id.
175. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
176. Id.
177. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492–93
(2010).
178. Id.
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constitutional underpinning for the plaque that President Truman
famously displayed on his desk and that said, “The buck stops here.”179
U.S. Supreme Court decisions reflect this constitutional (and political)
truth. The Court has relied on the Take Care Clause to strike down or
narrowly interpret laws that impair the President’s power to ensure the
faithful execution of federal law. Specifically, in Myers v. United
States180 and Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight
Board,181 the Court relied on the Take Care Clause to strike down laws
restricting the President’s power to remove subordinates.182 In Printz v.
United States,183 the Court relied on the Take Care Clause to strike down
a law that shifted responsibility for executing federal law to state and
local law enforcement agents, whom the President could not control.184
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,185 the Court refused to interpret a
federal law in a way that would allow private plaintiffs who lacked any
concrete injury to sue federal agencies for violations of federal law.186
The Lujan Court explained that such an interpretation would
unconstitutionally “transfer from the President to the courts the Chief
Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.’”187
179. DONALD R. MCCOY, THE PRESIDENCY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN 315 (1984).
180. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
181. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
182. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484 (striking down law that gave executive official
multiple layers of “good-cause” protection from presidential removal, and stating that “[t]he
President cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the
faithfulness of the officers who execute them”); Myers, 272 U.S. at 122, 176 (striking down Act
of Congress restricting President’s power to remove a postmaster and stating that “when the grant
of the executive power is enforced by the express mandate to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed, it emphasizes the necessity for including within the executive power as conferred the
exclusive power of removal”). But cf. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631 (1935)
(reading Myers narrowly to give President constitutionally irreducible power of removal only over
officials with “purely executive” duties).
183. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
184. Id. at 902, 922, 935 (striking down provision in federal Brady Act that required state
and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on would-be handgun buyers,
holding that law unconstitutionally sought to transfer President’s responsibility for faithful
execution of federal laws under Take Care Clause “to thousands of [chief law enforcement
officers] in the 50 States, who are left to implement the program without meaningful Presidential
control”).
185. 504 U.S. 555 (1992)
186. Id. at 571–77 (construing “citizen suit” provision of Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g) (2012)).
187. Id. at 577; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) (“The
Constitution . . . assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to ‘take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’ We could not recognize respondents’ standing in this
case without running afoul of that structural principle.” (citation omitted)).
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These decisions require interpreting the Antiquities Act to allow the
President to modify or abolish a monument established by a prior
president in violation of the Act.188 The decisions show that the Take Care
Clause makes the President responsible for faithful execution of federal
law during the President’s watch. The responsibility extends to ongoing
violations of federal law even if they were put into motion before that
president took office. The Antiquities Act does not expressly prevent the
President from revising or abolishing a national monument. And the Act
should not be interpreted that way, or else it would prevent the President
from taking care that the Act is faithfully executed during his or her term
in office.
C. The General Rule Preventing a President from Tying the Hands of
His or Her Successors
If the Antiquities Act were interpreted implicitly to bar the President
from abolishing a previously established monument, the Act would
violate the general rule that one president cannot bind a later president.189
That rule reflects longstanding presidential practices and the President’s
co-equality with Congress, as well as both branches’ accountability to the
people who elect them.
Longstanding presidential practices show that one president generally
cannot bind a later president. Specifically, presidents have always been
understood to be able to revoke executive orders issued by their
predecessors.190 This understanding applies to presidential proclamations
as well, because “[t]he difference between Executive orders and
proclamations is more one of form than of substance.”191 Likewise,
Presidents have consistently asserted the power to terminate international
agreements made by prior presidents.192 Of course, a President’s action
188. As explained in the text, Lujan is precedent for interpreting a federal statute to avoid an
interpretation that would violate the Take Care Clause. 504 U.S. at 577. Indeed, the Court has
relied on the Clause to uphold acts by the President that lack any express statutory support. In re
Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64–65, 67–68 (1890) (relying on the Take Care Clause to conclude that
President could have a federal marshal protect Justice Field even without express statutory
authority).
189. McConnell, supra note 165, at 300 (“Article II of the Constitution vests significant
discretionary authority in the President . . . . By ‘the President’ the Constitution of course means
the incumbent; the powers of the office cannot be exercised by former holders of the office.”);
Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 7, at 8–9.
190. VIVIAN S. CHU & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20846, EXECUTIVE
ORDERS: ISSUANCE, MODIFICATION, AND REVOCATION 7–8 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RS20846.pdf.
191. H.R. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND
PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 1 (Comm. Print 1957).
192. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 339 (AM.
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may have legal consequences—when, for example, it implicates
individual rights—that a later President cannot undo.193 But that is not the
same as saying the prior presidential act disables a later President from
undoing that action.194
Moreover, the principle that the President cannot be bound by
predecessors’ acts reflects the President’s equality with Congress. The
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that Congress cannot be bound by
the actions of prior Congresses.195 If the President, in contrast, could be
bound by the acts of predecessors, the President would lose the coequality
with Congress that the Constitution requires.196
LAW INST. 1987) (“Under the law of the United States, the President has the power . . . to suspend
or terminate an [international] agreement in accordance with its terms” and “to terminate or
suspend the agreement on behalf of the United States” upon determining that it has been violated
by another party or because of supervening events); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1006–07
(1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting from majority ruling that case was nonjusticiable and concluding,
on the merits, that President had power to abrogate defense treaty with Taiwan); see also LOUIS
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 211–12 (2d ed. 1996) (“Presidents have
claimed authority . . . to act for the United States to terminate treaties . . . .”); id. at 496 n.159
(stating that President’s power to terminate congressional-executive agreements “seems no
weaker than in regard to treaties”); STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44761,
WITHDRAWAL FROM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE PARIS AGREEMENT,
AND THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 7 (2018) (“In most cases, . . . the President has unilaterally
terminated executive agreements, and the Executive’s authority has not been questioned by
Members of Congress, or in judicial challenges . . . .”); id. at 10 (“In most cases,” President’s
unilateral withdrawal from, or termination of, treaties “has not generated significant opposition in
either chamber of Congress”). But cf. Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and
Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1324 (2008)
(arguing that Restatement (Third)’s view that President can withdraw from a treaty “has never
been formally upheld by the courts and remains controversial”).
193. For example, once the President grants a pardon, a future President cannot prosecute
the recipient for the pardoned conduct. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; McConnell, supra note
165, at 303.
194. Recognizing that the President’s actions may implicate individual rights that a later
President cannot undo merely puts the President on par with Congress, which likewise may take
actions implicating individual rights that a later Congress cannot undo. See, e.g., Perry v. United
States, 294 U.S. 330, 350, 353–54, 358 (1935) (one of the Gold Clause Cases; Court held that
Congress exceeded its authority in enacting a joint resolution reneging on payment terms of a
government bond issued under prior statute; Court rejected government’s argument that earlier
Congress could not restrict power of later Congress, but ultimately dismissed the case because
plaintiff had not shown damages).
195. See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 274 (2012) (“[S]tatutes enacted by one
Congress cannot bind a later Congress . . . .”); Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932)
(“[T]he will of a particular Congress . . . does not impose itself upon those to follow in succeeding
years.”); see also United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (referring to “the
centuries-old concept that one legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its successors”).
196. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749, 751 n.31 (1982) (relying partly on the
equality and independence of the three branches of federal government to justify recognizing
presidential immunity analogous to immunity that members of Congress enjoy under Speech and
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The same reason supports each branch’s freedom from restrictions
imposed by its predecessors: the electoral processes built into the
Constitution.197 Elections ensure that “[t]he conduct of the executive
branch, no less than the legislative, is . . . politically accountable.”198 In
particular, elections enable the people of today to reject the policies of
the past by electing candidates who pledge to undo them.199
Because it would be inconsistent with the electoral process for the
Antiquities Act to bar the President from abolishing a monument
established by his predecessor, the Act should not be interpreted to do so.
Instead, the Act’s express grant of “discretion” should be interpreted to
allow the current President to abolish a monument established by a prior
president.200
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT’S REDUCTION AND
RESCISSION AUTHORITY
A recent article by Professor Mark Squillace and others argues that
the President cannot reduce or rescind national monuments established
under the Antiquities Act of 1906.201 These arguments are reiterated in a
letter that 121 law professors submitted for the Interior Secretary’s 2017
review of twenty-seven national monuments.202 The Squillace article
relies mainly on three sources: (1) “contemporaneous laws” (from around
the time of the Antiquities Act of 1906) that expressly authorized the
President to modify or vacate prior presidential withdrawals of land;203
(2) a 1938 opinion in which Attorney General Homer Cummings
concluded that President Franklin D. Roosevelt could not abolish the
Castle Pinckney National Monument;204 and (3) the Federal Land Policy
Debate Clause, despite absence of similarly express constitutional language conferring
presidential immunity).
197. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2–3, at 125 n.1 (3d ed.
2000) (“[T]he Constitution limits trans-temporal commandeering of a branch by its current
occupants through the device of generally preventing any branch from making the meta-law
necessary to tie the hands of the future officeholders in that branch.”).
198. McConnell, supra note 165, at 300.
199. Id. (“When voters elect a new President, they expect that he will have authority to
change those policies that, under the Constitution and laws, are left to the discretion of the
executive.”).
200. Cf. id. (arguing that Article II vests discretionary power in the current President, not his
predecessors).
201. See Squillace et al., supra note 7, at 58 (arguing against the President’s power to reduce
and rescind national monuments).
202. See Letter from 121 Law Professors to Sec’y of Interior Ryan Zinke and Sec’y of
Commerce Wilbur Ross, supra note 7, at 1–2.
203. See Squillace et al., supra note 7, at 58.
204. Id. at 58–59; see generally 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 185 (1938) (stating the Antiquities Act
does not authorize the president to abolish established monuments).
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and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA).205 Those sources, however, at
best weakly support their argument.206
A. “Contemporaneous Laws”
The Squillace article’s authors contend that the “narrow authority
granted to the President to reserve land under the Antiquities Act stands
in marked contrast to contemporaneous laws that delegated much broader
executive authority to designate, repeal, or modify other types of federal
reservations of public lands.”207 They cite two such “contemporaneous
laws”: the Pickett Act of 1910208 and the Forest Service Organic
Administration Act of 1897.209
The Pickett Act sheds no light on the Antiquities Act. The Pickett Act
addressed only the President’s power to withdraw public lands
temporarily.210 Temporary withdrawals inherently must end. Thus,
Congress had to address in the Pickett Act how those withdrawals would
end. Congress ultimately rejected an automatic termination date in favor
of authorizing either the President or Congress to revoke withdrawals
under the Act.211 While authorizing the President only to make temporary
withdrawals, the Pickett Act allowed the President to reserve land

205. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2792 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43
U.S.C.); see Squillace et al., supra note 7, at 59–64.
206. Attorney General Cummings’s 1938 opinion and FLPMA are also relied on by the law
firm memorandum prepared for the National Parks Conservation Association opposing the
President’s power to reduce or rescind national monuments. Memorandum from Robert
Rosenbaum et al., Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, supra note 7, at 9–14.
207. Squillace et al., supra note 7, at 58 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
208. Pub. L. No. 61-303, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847 (1910), repealed by Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743, 2792 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
209. Ch. 2, 30 Stat. at 11, 36 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
210. Ch. 421, 36 Stat. at 847. The Pickett Act was prompted by an urgent situation in 1909:
Public land in California thought to contain oil was falling into private hands under the existing
mining laws so quickly that officials predicted all of those public oil lands would become private
within “a few months,” and then the government would have to repurchase the land to obtain oil
for use by the Navy. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 466–67 (1915). To halt the
rapid privatization of public oil lands, President Taft issued a “Temporary Petroleum Withdrawal”
order withdrawing more than 3 million acres of public land from private development under the
mining laws. Id. at 467. President Taft’s temporary withdrawal order said that it was “[in] aid of
proposed legislation affecting the use and disposition of the petroleum deposits on the public
domain.” Id. (quoting Temporary Petroleum Withdrawal No. 5). After issuing the order, President
Taft asked Congress to give him specific authority to make temporary withdrawals of land for the
purpose of submitting legislation to Congress. 1 WHEATLEY, JR., supra note 15, at 88–89.
Congress enacted the Pickett Act in response to the President’s request for authority to make
temporary withdrawals. Getches, supra note 15, at 290.
211. Getches, supra note 15, at 294 n.82.
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withdrawn under the Act for any “public purposes.”212 Thus, the power
the Pickett Act granted to the President was broad in scope but limited in
duration.213
In contrast, the power granted to the President by the Antiquities Act
is narrow in scope but indefinite in duration. Most importantly, in the
Antiquities Act, Congress did not need to expressly address the duration
of monuments and whether the President could modify or terminate them.
In contrast, Congress did need to address these issues in the Pickett Act
because the subject of that Act was temporary withdrawals. Given this
necessity, Congress’s addressing them in the Pickett Act sheds no light
on Congress’s failure to do so in the Antiquities Act, where there was no
such necessity.
Also unilluminating is the Forest Service Organic Administration Act
of 1897. That Act stemmed from what one Senator called an
“extraordinary emergency.”214 The emergency arose under an 1891
federal law that authorized the President to set aside public land as forest
reserves.215 On February 22, 1897, President Grover Cleveland relied on
the 1891 law to set aside about 20 million acres of public land in the West
as forest reserves.216 Cleveland’s reservations mistakenly included entire
towns, mining camps, and other settlements where, because of the
reservations, people could no longer legally cut firewood for cooking and
staying warm.217 Western legislators urgently lobbied Cleveland’s
successor, President William McKinley, to vacate or modify Cleveland’s
executive orders establishing the reservations.218 McKinley reportedly
felt some “timidity” about modifying or revoking Cleveland’s
reservations.219 In addition, some legislators doubted McKinley’s power
212. Ch. 421, 36 Stat. at 847.
213. See 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 73, 73–74 (1941) (opinion of then-Attorney General Robert H.
Jackson, concluding that Pickett Act did not affect President’s authority to make permanent
withdrawals); see also 1 WHEATLEY, JR., supra note 15, at 108–20 (discussing background of
Jackson’s 1941 opinion on the Pickett Act).
214. 30 CONG. REC. 920 (1897) (statement of Sen. Gorman).
215. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103.
216. Proclamation Nos. 19–31, 29 Stat. 893–912; 29 CONG. REC. 2677 (1897) (statement of
Rep. Lacey, incorrectly citing the law on which President Cleveland relied as having been enacted
in “1890,” rather than 1891); see also PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
DEVELOPMENT 569 (1968) (stating that the President issued executive orders pursuant to the law
enacted in 1891).
217. E.g., 29 CONG. REC. 2513 (1897) (statement of Sen. Clark that reservations in effect
provide that “the settler . . . shall not burn a stick of timber in all that land to light his hearth”); id.
at 2678 (statement of Rep. Gamble).
218. 30 CONG. REC. 1007 (1897) (statement of Rep. Knowles) (“We have already tried for
two months to have this order [i.e., President Cleveland’s executive orders creating the forest
reserves] revoked.”).
219. Id. (statement of Rep. Ellis).
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to do so, though others had no such doubts.220 The President’s power to
alter or undo Cleveland’s forest reservations became particularly
problematic after the Senate approved provisions nullifying or
suspending those reservations.221 Given this congressional action, could
the President also take action?
The bill ultimately enacted in the wake of this emergency had two,
essentially duplicative, provisions addressing the President’s power to
modify or vacate forest reservations. One provision immediately
preceded the provision that suspended Cleveland’s reservations, and said
that its purpose was “to remove any doubt which may exist pertaining to
the authority of the President” to vacate or modify forest reservations
under the 1891 law.222 The second provision authorizing the President to
220. 29 CONG. REC. 2677 (1897) (statement of Rep. Pickler that President has “always” had
power to revoke or modify forest reservations, in response to which Rep. Lacey denies it); id. at
2973 (statement of Rep. Mondell) (“It seems to be an open question whether the President has the
power after he has once established these reservations to restore it to the public domain or change
its boundaries.”); 30 CONG. REC. 914 (1897) (statement of Sen. Gray that President Cleveland,
like himself, doubted whether President could modify orders establishing forest reservations
under the 1891 law); id. at 1400 (statement of Rep. Cannon) (“The better opinion is that the
President of the United States has no power to take any one acre out of that [i.e., President
Cleveland’s] reservation[s].”).
221. The Senate first passed a provision nullifying the Cleveland reservations at the end of
the 54th Congress, but it was defeated. 29 CONG. REC. 2677 (1897) (reproducing Senate
amendment No. 72 to House budget bill); id. at 2680 (reporting House vote rejecting Senate
amendment No. 72 by approving Rep. Lacey’s amendment to that amendment); id. at 2970
(reporting result of conference, in which Senate receded from provision nullifying Cleveland’s
reservation); id. at 2971–73 (statement of Rep. Mondell explaining background of nullification
provision). In the 55th Congress, the Senate passed a provision that suspended the Cleveland
reservations, rather than vacating them entirely. See 30 CONG. REC. 909 (1897) (reproducing
amendment to appropriation bill proposed by Sen. Pettigrew, which suspended Cleveland’s
reservations); id. at 925 (Senate approval of the amendment). In the House, Rep. Clark asked, “If
these Cleveland reservations are knocked in the head, then is-there [sic] any provision in the law
by which the present President can make a forest reservation?” Id. at 1012. Rep. Cannon
responded that no, it would not be “in the power of any President . . . to put any one acre of this
20,000,000 acres in a forest reservation.” Id.; see also id. at 909 (statement of Sen. Pettigrew)
(“[I]f we should simply suspend the order [i.e., the Cleveland reservations] without saying that
the President is authorized to renew the order after the survey is made the executive department
might not feel authorized to again establish forest reservations within the areas to be vacated by
this amendment.”). The House–Senate conference eventually agreed to a provision that suspended
Cleveland’s reservations while authorizing the President to vacate or modify forest reservations
that, like Cleveland’s, were made under the 1891 law. Id. at 1397 (reproducing conference report).
222. 30 CONG. REC. 980 (1897) (“[T]o remove any doubt which may exist pertaining to the
authority of the President thereunto, the President of the United States is hereby authorized and
empowered to revoke, modify, or suspend any and all such Executive orders and proclamations
[creating Forest reserves under the 1891 law], or any part thereof, from time to time, as he shall
deem best for the public interests: Provided, That the Executive orders and proclamations dated
February 22, 1897, setting apart and reserving certain lands in the States of Wyoming, Utah,
Montana, Washington, Idaho, and South Dakota as forest reservations, be, and they are hereby,
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vacate or modify forest reservations was not limited to forest reservations
under the 1891 law.223
Thus, the Forest Service Organic Administration Act of 1897
addressed the President’s power to modify or vacate land reservations
made by a prior president under an earlier law because a doubt arose
about that power, and immediate action was necessary. The 1897 Act
shows that Congress may expressly address the modification and
vacation power to “remove any doubt” about their existence.224 The 1897
Act does not show, however, that the modification and revocation powers
do not exist unless Congress expressly grants them. Rather, the specific
mention of these powers in the 1897 law reflects a desire to include
arguably superfluous language to remove doubt that might otherwise
arise, enabling immediate action to address the life-threatening situation
caused by a prior president’s action.225
suspended, and the lands embraced therein restored to the public domain the same as though said
orders and proclamations had not been issued . . . .”).
223. 30 CONG. REC. 912 (1897) (“The President is hereby authorized at any time to modify
any Executive order that has been or may hereafter be made establishing any forest reserve, and
by such modification may reduce the area or change the boundary lines of such reserve, or may
vacate altogether any order creating such reserve.”). This provision appears to have originated
from a conference held at the end of the 54th Congress. See 29 CONG. REC. 2973 (1897) (statement
of Rep. Mondell); see also 30 Cong. Rec. 911 (1897) (statement of Sen. Allison) (“Therefore it
was that . . . by unanimous consent there was placed upon the [appropriations] bill as it passed the
two Houses before the 4th of March [i.e., the end of the 54th Congress] a provision to enable the
President of the United States, Mr. McKinley, to change, vacate, or modify this order [i.e., the
Cleveland reservations].”). The other provision expressly authorizing the President to vacate or
modify forest reservations made under the 1891 law emerged from the conference held in the 55th
Congress. See id. at 1397 (reproducing conference report).
224. 30 CONG. REC. 980 (1897).
225. Cf. Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 487 (2012) (concluding that Congress’s
inclusion of a provision expressly addressing tax evasion offenses did not prevent interpreting a
more generally worded provision also to encompass tax evasion offenses). In addition to the
Pickett Act and the Forest Service Organic Administration Act of 1897, Professor Rasband cites
the Carey Act of 1894 and the Reclamation Act of 1902 as laws expressly granting to the executive
power to revoke a prior withdrawal. Rasband, supra note 7, at 626–27. These laws differ too much
from the Antiquities Act to illuminate its meaning. As originally enacted, the Carey Act
authorized the Interior Secretary to contract with states to give them federally owned desert lands
if they reclaimed the land through irrigation within ten years. Carey Act of 1894, ch. 301, § 4, 28
Stat. 372, 422. The original Act did not, however, say what would happen if the state did not meet
the ten-year deadline. Congress amended the Act in 1901 to clarify that the Secretary could, in his
discretion, extend the deadline by five years or “restore such lands to the public domain.” Act of
Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 853, § 3, 31 Stat. 1133, 1188. Thus, the Carey Act does not expressly use the
terms “withdrawal” or “revocation” in describing the Secretary’s powers. More fundamentally, it
does not bear on the Antiquities Act’s meaning because, like the Pickett Act, it deals with a timelimited setting aside of public land, and, like the Forest Service Organic Administration Act of
1897, it expressly addresses the Secretary’s power to restore land to the public domain
undoubtedly because a question arose concerning the existence of that power. The Reclamation
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B. Attorney General Homer Cummings’s 1938 Opinion
As discussed above, Attorney General Cummings recognized in his
1938 opinion that “the President from time to time has diminished the
area of national monuments established under the Antiquities Act by
removing or excluding lands therefrom.”226 In his view, however, “it does
not follow from [the President’s] power so to confine [i.e., reduce] th[e]
area [covered by a monument] that he has the power to abolish a
monument entirely.”227 But it does follow from the President’s power to
reduce the size of a monument that the President can abolish it altogether.
Indeed, it is illogical to conclude otherwise. It makes no sense to conclude
that the President could reduce a monument by 50%, or by 95%—
because, for example, the President determines that the excluded land
never contained or no longer contains antiquities—but cannot abolish a
monument altogether if, for example, the President concludes that the
land contains no protectable objects whatsoever (or no longer does so). If
one acknowledges the President’s power to reduce a monument, as so
many presidents have done, logic compels the conclusion that the
President can abolish a monument.
Furthermore, as discussed in a recent white paper, General
Cummings’s 1938 opinion is “erroneous as a matter of law,” for three
reasons.228
First, the 1938 opinion mistakenly relies on an 1862 opinion by
Attorney General Bates. General Bates concluded in 1862 that, having
reserved land for military purposes, the President could not unilaterally
open those lands to settlement under the Preemption Act of 1841.229
General Cummings read General Bates’s opinion to stand for the broad
principle that once the President reserves land under an Act of Congress,
the President can never rescind the reservation.230 That reading is dubious
to the extent that General Bates’s opinion rested on the particular statute
governing the particular reservation and the President’s undoing of that
Act of 1902 allowed the Secretary of Interior to make temporary withdrawals of land pending a
determination of whether the withdrawn land was suitable for irrigation works, and, if not, to
restore the land to the public domain. Act of June 17, 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-161, ch. 1093, § 3, 32
Stat. 388, 388 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 416 (2012)). This 1902 Act does not illuminate
the Antiquities Act’s meaning for the same reason that the Pickett Act does not: Because Congress
knew it was authorizing temporary withdrawals, it knew that it had to specify how they would
end.
226. 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 185, 188 (1938).
227. Id.
228. Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 7, at 5.
229. 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 359, 367–68 (1862).
230. 39 Op. Att’y Gen. at 186–87 (“My predecessors have held that if public lands are
reserved by the President for a particular purpose under express authority of an act of Congress,
the President is thereafter without authority to abolish such reservation.”).
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reservation.231 General Bates also relied on “the almost uniform practice
of the Government in the disposition of military reservations.”232 These
bases for General Bates’s 1862 opinion had no bearing on the entirely
different situation before General Cummings in 1938.
Second, insofar as General Bates and Cummings relied on general
principles, their reliance was unfounded. For instance, General
Cummings quoted Bates’s statement that “[t]he grant of power to execute
a trust, even discretionally, by no means implies the further power to undo
it when it has been completed.”233 Even assuming trust law is apt, it does
not indicate the President lacks authority to abolish a monument:
Under general trust principles, at least in the 20th and 21st
centuries, the power to create a trust includes the power to
revoke it when the settler retains an interest in it, unless the
trust is expressly irrevocable under the original grant of
authority.234
Those principles apply to monument designations under the Act because
the federal government claims ownership and control of land before and
after the designation. And that circumstance distinguishes the abolition
of monuments from the situation addressed by General Bates in 1862,
which concerned opening public land to private sale and settlement.235
Third, General Cummings’s 1938 opinion relied on reasoning that
merely begged the ultimate question of statutory interpretation. Quoting
General Bates, Cummings wrote:
A duty properly performed by the Executive under statutory
authority has the validity and sanctity which belongs to the
statute itself, and, unless it be within the terms of the power
conferred by that statute, the Executive can no more destroy
his own authorized work, without some other legislative
sanction, than any other person can. To assert such a
principle is to claim for the Executive the power to repeal or
alter an act of Congress at will.236
This begs the question of whether the President’s abolition of a
231. 10 Op. Att’y Gen. at 363 (“[N]o such power [to abolish the reservation] is conferred on
the President in the act under which the selection of a site for Fort Armstrong was made.”).
232. Id. at 366 (emphasis added); see also id. at 367 (referring to “the vigilance with which
Congress exercised its power of control over military sites”); id. at 368 (“[C]ertain facts disclosed
in the papers you have submitted, which show that the theory that the Rock Island reservation had
been [abolished] . . . was never accepted by either the legislative or executive departments of the
Government.”).
233. 39 Op. Att’y Gen. at 187 (quoting 10 Op. Att’y Gen. at 364).
234. Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 7, at 6.
235. 10 Op. Att’y Gen. at 367.
236. 39 Op. Att’y Gen. at 187 (quoting 10 Op. Att’y Gen. at 364) (emphasis added).
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monument is “within the terms of the power conferred by” the Antiquities
Act. General Cummings did not squarely address that question; he
apparently assumed that since the Act did not expressly authorize
abolition, it did not confer such authority even implicitly. Yet Cummings
recognized that presidents had reduced monuments even though the Act
does not expressly sanction their reduction. Ultimately, then, his
reasoning rested on the unexamined assumption that, although the Act
may impliedly authorize the President to reduce a monument, it impliedly
forbids the President from abolishing it. Nothing in logic or law supports
that assumption.
C. FLPMA
A heading in the recent Squillace article argues: “FLPMA clarifies
that only Congress can revoke or downsize a national monument.”237 In
the text underneath this heading, it turns out that the authors actually rely
more on the FLPMA’s legislative history than on the Act itself. In
particular, they rely on a House committee report stating that FLPMA
“would . . . specifically reserve to the Congress the authority to modify
and revoke withdrawals for national monuments created under the
Antiquities Act.”238 Their reliance on FLPMA’s legislative history has
three problems.
First, the quoted statement from the House committee report has no
support in the text of FLPMA. In stating that FLPMA would “specifically
reserve to the Congress the authority to modify and revoke withdrawals
for national monuments,”239 the report was referring to Section 204(j) of
FLPMA, which was (and remains) the only FLPMA provision that
specifically mentions monuments. Section 204(j) said (and says) in
relevant part, “The Secretary shall not . . . modify or revoke any
withdrawal creating national monuments under [the Antiquities
Act] . . . .”240 Thus, contrary to the statement in the House committee
report, Section 204(j) does not reserve to Congress the power to modify
or abolish national monuments; it merely denies that power to the
Secretary. Thus, the authors rely on legislative history that lacks a
foundation in statutory text.
237. Squillace et al., supra note 7, at 59.
238. Id. at 63 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1163, at 9 (1976)); see also John Freemuth, A Closer
Look at Trump’s Antiquities Act Order, LAW360 (May 10, 2017, 12:34 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/922159/a-closer-look-at-trump-s-antiquities-act-order (quoting
same House committee report language and stating that “[o]ne interpretation of this House report
would suggest that Congress reserved the revocation power in terms of national monuments to
itself”).
239. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1163, at 9.
240. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(j) (2012).
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Second, not only does their argument lack support in the text of
FLPMA, it also lacks a foundation in the very House committee report
statement that they quote. That committee report statement, quoted in the
paragraph above, indicates that Section 204(j) reserves to Congress the
power to modify or revoke monuments. The authors do not, however,
actually argue that Section 204(j) has this effect. Rather, they argue that
“FLPMA”—the statute as a whole—“clarifies” that the Antiquities Act
had that effect.241 But that is not what the committee report says. The text
of the report indicates that Section 204(j) reserves to Congress the power
to modify and revoke monuments, and it does not use the term “clarifies”
(or a synonymous term like “confirms”) in describing Section 204(j). In
short, the House committee report attributes to Section 204(j), not the
Antiquities Act as a whole, the supposed restriction on executive power
to reduce or abolish monuments.
And third, when the authors finally grapple with the text of Section
204(j), they offer a dubious account. In their view, members of the House
subcommittee that drafted FLPMA had the “mistaken impression” that
the Secretary of Interior, rather than the President, “created national
monuments” under the Antiquities Act.242 Although the authors say that
this misunderstanding was cleared up, it led the subcommittee to
conclude that the President’s authority to create national monuments
should be transferred to the Secretary of Interior.243 So the subcommittee
drafted a provision amending the Antiquities Act to transfer the
President’s power to create monuments to the Secretary.244 But the
subcommittee did not want the Secretary to be able to modify or abolish
monuments. To prevent this, they drafted Section 204(j).245 The
subcommittee later dropped the provision transferring the President’s
monument-creating authority to the Secretary, while retaining (for
eventual enactment) Section 204(j)’s denial of secretarial authority to
modify or revoke a monument.246 In the final analysis, then, the authors
contend that, by denying to the Secretary power to modify or abolish a
national monument, Congress in the 1976 FLPMA “clarified” that
Congress in the 1906 Antiquities Act meant to deny that authority to the
President.247

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Squillace et al., supra note 7, at 59.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id. at 62 & n.32.
Id. at 62–63.
Id. at 71.
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Maybe so.248 In all events, this example shows why even members of
the U.S. Supreme Court who consider legislative history when
interpreting a statute are “wary” of relying on the legislative history of
later statutes.249 Wariness is particularly warranted when, as in the
Squillace article, the argument based on subsequent legislative history
rests on key members of Congress’s purported misunderstanding of the
earlier statute.250
248. It is at least equally likely that Section 204(j) of FLPMA was meant to confirm the
President’s power—as distinguished from that of the Secretary of Interior—to reduce or abolish,
as well as create, national monuments under the Antiquities Act. Section 204 as a whole authorizes
the Secretary of Interior to “make, modify, extend, or revoke withdrawals” of public land. 43
U.S.C. § 1714(a) (2012). Thus, that Section gives the Secretary withdrawal authority that might
otherwise be exercised by the President. Section 204(j), however, restricts the Secretary’s
withdrawal authority in several ways, including by barring the Secretary from modifying or
revoking withdrawals creating national monuments under the Antiquities Act. Id. § 1714(j). In
this way, Section 204(j) prevents Section 204 as a whole from being read to transfer the
President’s powers under the Act to the Secretary.
249. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 626–27 (2004).
250. Besides the three sources cited in the article by Professors Squillace et al. in support of
their argument that the President lacks power to reduce or rescind a national monument, the Law
Professors’ Letter, supra note 7, at 3, cites the oral argument in Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S.
75 (2005). This additional source provides exceptionally weak support for the argument that the
President lacks authority to abolish a monument.
One issue in Alaska was whether, when Alaska became a State, the United States intended to
retain title to the submerged land under Glacier Bay. Id. at 99–100. When Alaska became a State,
Glacier Bay was in the Glacier Bay National Monument. Id. at 101–02. The Court held that, when
creating the monument in 1925, the United States reserved title to the submerged lands and, when
Alaska became a State in 1959, Congress expressed an intention to retain title to those lands in
the Alaska Statehood Act. Id. at 100–10.
At oral argument in the case, the government’s attorney said:
[U]nder the Antiquities Act, the President is given authority to create national
monuments, but they cannot be disestablished except by Act of Congress. Now,
Congress could have disestablished this monument if it had meant to give up the
land. It could have disestablished some part of it, and it chose not to do so. And
yet, that’s another indication that Congress was intending to retain those lands.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Alaska, 545 U.S. 75 (No. 128) (emphasis added). Three points
about the government attorney’s italicized statement warrant attention. First, his assertion that the
President cannot disestablish a monument was irrelevant to his main point, which was that
“Congress could have disestablished this monument if it had meant to give up the land.” Id.
Whatever the President’s power, Congress indisputably has the power to disestablish—i.e.,
abolish—a national monument, including ones established by the President under the Antiquities
Act, and Congress has done so several times. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. Thus,
the attorney’s statement about the President’s power is lawyer’s dicta, unnecessary to his actual
rationale. Second, the Court did not accept the attorney’s argument that Congress showed its intent
to retain title to the submerged land by not disestablishing the monument at the time of statehood.
See Alaska, 545 U.S. at 103. Instead, the Court relied on the Alaska Statehood Act as expressing
Congress’s intent to retain title. See id. at 103–04 (declining reliance on Antiquities Act in favor
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CONCLUSION
Controversy has long surrounded presidents’ creation of national
monuments under the Antiquities Act. The controversy has come to a
head because of President Trump’s massive reduction of the Grand
Escalante and Bears Ears monuments. This Article has argued that the
Antiquities Act authorized Trump’s action.

of Alaska Statehood Act); see also id. at 113 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Though the Court makes a
dictal feint toward the Antiquities Act . . . its holding relies on . . . the Alaska Statehood Act.”
(citation omitted)). Third, when discussing the history of the Glacier Bay National Monument,
the Court cites President Eisenhower’s proclamation excluding certain land from the monument
(while adding other land to it). Id. at 101 (citing Proclamation No. 3089, 3 C.F.R. 36 (1954–
1958)). The Court plainly recognized that this proclamation excluded certain land from the
monument, because the Court observed that, while the proclamation “alter[ed] the monument’s
boundaries,” it “le[ft] the bay’s waters within them.” Id. at 101. The Court thus implied that the
proclamation was effective in excluding certain land that had originally been included. If
anything, therefore, the Court’s decision in Alaska supports the President’s power to reduce the
size of national monuments.
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